3 West African Countries Most Affected by Terrorism

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The Global Terrorism Index 2022 recently released has highlighted Nigeria, Mali, and Niger as the West African countries most affected by terrorism.

Below are some snapshots from the report.

Nigeria

The report states that Nigeria has had 8,915 deaths from terrorism reported since 2007. The image below breaks down the attacks.

According to the report in 2021, ISWA recorded its highest number of incidents and third-highest death toll since 2017. Overall, ISWA was responsible for 39 percent of all attacks in Nigeria in 2021. Despite this, the lethality of ISWA attacks has continued to decline from 10 deaths per attack in 2018 to almost three deaths per attack in 2021.

ISWA was responsible for Nigeria’s deadliest attack of 2021, with gunmen killing over 30 soldiers at an army base in the Borno region. ISWA’s main target continues to be military personnel, with the military being the target of over half of all attacks, resulting in 45 percent of casualties attributed to the group in 2021. Despite the civilian death toll decreasing, ISWA continues to increase its attacks on civilians, from 11 in 2020 to 19 in 2021.

Mali

In 2021, Mali recorded the highest number of terrorist attacks and deaths in the last decade. Rising political instability added to the difficulties of fighting terrorism.

Here is a breakdown of attacks in Mali.

One of the worst attacks happened in Songho and Bandiagara where gunmen killed at least 33 civilians and injured at least seven others in an attack on a public bus on 3 December 2021. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.

Niger

In 2021, Niger recorded 588 deaths as a result of terrorism. This is the highest terror-related death toll in the last decade. Civilians accounted for 78 percent of these casualties, resulting in Niger becoming the country with the third-highest civilian death toll in 2021.

Niger’s deadliest attack of 2021 occurred in a village in the Tillaberi region when gunmen on motorbikes killed 70 civilians and wounded another 17. ISWA claimed responsibility, indicating they targeted pro-government militia members.

Here is a breakdown of attacks in Niger:

At Arete, we provide security services throughout West Africa. You can email us here info@arete-group.com or click here to learn more.

Click here to download the full report.

Ghana commissions 4 Navy ships

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In a bid to ramp up maritime security, President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo of Ghana has commissioned four new vessels for the Ghana Navy.

Christened Ghana Navy Ship Volta, Ghana Navy Ship Densu, Ghana Navy Ship Pra, and Ghana Navy Ship Ankobra, these aluminium offshore vessels will help the Navy to provide dedicated security to the country’s offshore oil and gas installations.

They were commissioned at a ceremony on Friday, February 25, at the Sekondi-Takoradi Naval Base in the Western Region.  President Akufo-Addo said the acquisition of the vessels was a manifestation of the commitment of the Government to retool and re-equip the Ghana Armed Forces to enable them to perform their duty of protecting the territorial integrity of Ghana.

The President noted that the provision of effective maritime security was of utmost importance because Ghana’s economy was highly dependent on offshore resources.

He said: “Therefore, the Ghana Navy, as the lead maritime security agency, deserves all the support it needs to enable it to carry out its duties efficiently and effectively.”

You can read the full story here.

EU Energy Disruptions & The Gulf of Guinea

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Background

With the world’s eyes looking towards the stand-off between Russia and Ukraine / NATO, we discuss whether the potential instability to the energy supply will trigger an increased interest by the EU in securing the sea lanes and the supply of LNG from West African suppliers.

The potential for armed conflict in Europe remains significant at this time and any outbreak of hostilities will likely lead to an immediate interruption of existing natural gas supplies to Western Europe.  

Not only would this have a profound economic impact in those markets, but also on the Russian economy, which is already suffering under the pressure of sanctions imposed following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and their continued support for ethnic Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine.  

In event of (continued) disruption, Western consumer countries may well seek to acquire LNG supplies from other world producers, e.g. those in the Gulf of Guinea, resulting in a potential consolidation of recent western interest in securing the Gulf of Guinea maritime space and sea-lanes from piracy.

At present tensions between Russia and Ukraine are contributing to the soaring price of oil, which has risen almost 60% in 12 months from around $60/barrel in February 2021 to $94.42 on 11 February 2022, noting that the general rise in oil and gas prices also has been partially triggered by economies recovering from the effects of lockdowns imposed in order to battle the Covid-19 pandemic. (Click here to read more)

Europe’s Gas Suppliers – How Important is Russia?

Russia has built itself a position as the major supplier of gas to much of Europe (by example it is the sole supplier to some Balkans countries and supplies more than 50% of the gas consumed in most of the rest of the Balkans and the Baltic States).  The UK, by contrast, imports very little Russian gas.  However, Russian gas is, without doubt, a strategically important source of energy in most of Western Europe, as the graphic below clearly illustrates.

(Image source – Click here)

Overall, more than 30% of Europe’s gas supply comes from Russia and several strategically vital pipelines run through Ukraine.   Even if Russia decides not to ‘weaponise’ the supply of gas, the pipelines would almost certainly be disrupted by any fighting in Ukraine.  Russia has used the supply of gas as a political weapon in the past, e.g. when it turned off the supply to the Georgian Republic in 2006 as part of a political strategy to force the Georgians to abandon plans to join NATO. (Click here to read more.)

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Russia would cut gas supplies to Europe completely – at least not intentionally – as this would be as damaging for the Russian economy as for those it supplies.  In addition, Moscow is currently working very hard to get the Nordstream 2 pipeline commissioned to bring gas to western Europe via the Baltic route (achieving this would dramatically reduce the EU’s reliance on the gas coming through Ukraine and potentially allow Moscow to achieve its geostrategic aims regarding Ukraine with much less interest coming from Brussels).  

However, limited reductions could apply enough pressure to drive a political accommodation of Putin’s demands.  The principal targets would likely be Germany and France – seen as the two biggest influencers in the EU and important member nations of NATO.

While the EU has threatened to impose damaging sanctions on Russia if it invades Ukraine, the position of the 27 states is not homogenous and the issue has created and exposed divisions with the bloc.  The EU’s fragile position has gained the attention of Washington and might have been a significant factor behind President Biden’s call for other world producers to ramp up their production.  (Read more by clicking here)

Can Africa fill the Gap? 

Africa has a number of producers of LNG, including Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and Algeria.  The two biggest African producers, Algeria and Egypt, are Mediterranean countries with relatively short supply chains into the European markets.  However, only Algeria has the ability to export gas to Europe via a pipeline – the Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline which runs via Morocco to Spain (Click here to read more)– and Egypt’s LNG plants are already operating at capacity. (Click here to read more)

Despite the advantages of short supply chains and existing infrastructure in the two Mediterranean producers, Nigeria reportedly exported more LNG than any other African country in 2021 (in 2020, Nigeria was also the world’s 6th largest producer and exporter of LNG). Click here to read more.

Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) has also started the long-awaited Train 7 project at Bonny, which will increase the country’s production capacity from 22 to 30 million tonnes per annum.  Most of this increased production will be exported to foreign markets.  This existing and future supply of LNG from Africa’s top producer is not only vitally important for the country’s economy, but it could also help diversify global supply and fill the gap if Russian gas supplies are interrupted.  

But supplies from Nigeria are not without problems.  NLNG’s bonny terminal has been forced to declare force majeure in the past due to interruptions of the supply of feedstock to the plant.  These have been caused by technical failures on pipelines as well as security-related interruptions of the flow of gas.  The challenges in the supply chain do not end at the liquefaction plant.  The plant itself has been the site of security incidents and the LNG carrier vessels have also been targeted – although perhaps not as frequently as other types of tanker.

So the key question perhaps is, can Nigeria be regarded as a reliable supplier to European markets given the problem of piracy in both Nigeria and elsewhere throughout the Gulf of Guinea.

Historical Targeting of LNG carriers?

LNG carriers are targeted less frequently by pirates than other classes of vessels in the Gulf of Guinea.  This might be a reflection of their lower numbers in the region and the lower rate of them presenting themselves as a target, but as can be seen from the incident summaries below, they are often fired upon by pirate groups (despite the inherent risks involved in attacking such vessels).  

Arete has records of at least 14 attacks on LNG carriers in the region since 2014 and in almost every case, the attackers failed to board the vessel and it was able to continue to sail to its destination.  Despite these statistics, the threat to vessels of this class remains high, with opportunist attacks on vessels close inshore and more organised pirate operations in the deepwater environment – possible for crew kidnap.  Indeed, the pirates are becoming more sophisticated in their planning and

execution of their attacks and they are apparently using their own intelligence-gathering capabilities very effectively in the selection and targeting of specific vessels.

24 April 2014.  An unidentified LNG carrier was approached by a suspicious vessel as she was underway 40 nm south of Brass. The master raised the alarm, increased speed, altered course, activated fire hoses, and had the crew direct searchlights toward the small boat. After 10 minutes the small boat departed the area. 

05 February 2016.  The Liberian flagged LNG carrier Pskov, IMO number 9630028, was attacked approximately 16nM SW of Bonny Island while steaming.  Seven persons wearing dark boiler suits with red caps in a speed boat chased and attempted to board the tanker underway. The alarm was raised, fire hoses activated, Master increased speed to maximum and took evasive manoeuvres. When the speed boat was close to a distance of 10 meters, machine guns and a ladder were sighted. Due to the hardening measures taken by the Master, the persons aborted the attempted boarding and fled.

20 April 2016. The Spanish-flagged LNG Tanker TMO Knutsen Bilbao, IMO number 9236432, was attacked 13nm SW of the Bonny Fairway Buoy and 22nm South-South-West of Bonny.  The tanker turned around.  The vessel escaped the attack and proceeded to the LNG terminal at Bonny.  

10 March 2017. While proceeding to Bonny, the Spanish flagged LNG tanker, MT La Mancha Knutsen, IMO number 9721724, was attacked by 6-7 men in a speedboat 9nm from Akpo field.  After taking evasive manoeuvres and an increase in speed, the vessel was able to evade the attackers. The pirates were unable to board and all crew were reported safe.  After the attack, a ladder was observed on the tanker and the speed boat was observed heading east (In between Bioko Island & Sao Tome).  

29 April 2017, the Bermuda flagged LNG carrier, LNG Lokoja, IMO number 9629960, was attacked approximately 40 N miles South West of Bonny terminal.  The attack occurred after the escort vessel departed and when NNS military vessel was supporting the Vectis Progress in the same area. Two inflatable RIBs with 4 or 5 armed men on board approached the LNG tanker and fired 5 to 10 shots at the accommodation area of the vessel. The vessel implemented BMP4 measures, increased speed, altered course and took defensive action (VHF16 alarm, use of water spray, barbed wire). The vessel managed to escape. After short pursuit, the assailants abandoned their pursuit.

21 October 2017, an unnamed LNG tanker, possibly Bermuda flagged LNG Bonny II, IMO number 9692002, was attacked approximately 5 nm south of the Bonny Fairway Buoy.  According to one source, the pirates attempted to board the tanker.   

06 November 2018.  the Bermuda-flagged LNG tanker LNG River Niger, IMO number 9262235, was approached and pursued by a single speedboat with 9 armed men on board 30nM SSW of Bonny.  The vessel was underway at 17.2kts at the time of the approach and was inbound to Bonny having transited from Altamira (Mexico).  The pirates fired upon both the starboard and port sides. Master enacted evasive manoeuvres and crew retreated to the citadel. Two bullet strikes on the bridge below the centre window.  Attack failed and the Nigerian Navy escorted the vessel to Bonny.  

March 2019, the Bermuda flagged LNG tanker, LNG Akwa Ibom, IMO number 9252209,  was approached by 2x boats with 6x men in each boat all dressed in black with red ribbons, approximately 66nm SW of Bonny Fairway Buoy, whilst inbound to Bonny NLNG Terminal. One speed boat crossed the vessel bow but an armed escort vessel responded and as she approached the 2x speed boats left the area. 

28 December 2019.  the Bermuda flagged LNG tanker, LNG Lokoja, IMO number 9269960 was attacked approximately 195NM WNW of Libreville, Gabon and 70 nm NW of Sao Tome while en route to Bonny.  Attack was launched from a single speedboat with 10 armed men on board. The pirates opened fire on the vessel.  The vessel conducted evasive manoeuvres. The tanker later was approached by Nigerian patrol boat Defender 6, and as of 1430 hrs, local time was underway heading for Bonny, escorted by Defender 6 and the Portuguese Naval vessel Zaire.   

17 October 2020. the Marshall Islands flagged LNG tanker MT Methane Princess, IMO  number 9253715, was boarded whilst at anchor in position 03:46.57.443N 008:41.52.62E, off Malabo in the Punta Europa Anchorage.  The vessel was attacked shortly after breaking offloading operations. The alarm was sounded and all on deck were able to retreat to the citadel. 2 Filipino nationals were on the jetty and both were taken hostage. One of the hostages jumped off of the pirate vessel and was rescued but sustained injuries. One person entering the citadel was also injured. Total of 1 hostage taken.  

05 December 2020, the French-flagged LNG tanker, MT Verrazane, IMO number 9649146, was approached approximately 210nm South of Lagos. The alarm was raised, and the accompanying security escort vessel (SEV) was vectored towards the approaching speedboat.  The perpetrators abandoned the approach on spotting the SEV. 

18 December 2020. The Bermuda flagged LNG tanker LNG Lagos II was approached while in transit by one-speed boat containing 8-10 175nm SW Bayelsa State.  Alert raised onboard. The vessel started evasive manoeuvres. One ladder was spotted on board the speed boat. Speed boat stopped the approach. Vessel and crew are safe. 

08 February 2021, the Spanish flagged LNG carrier, LMNG Madrid Spirit, IMO number 9259276, noticed a skiff approaching at high speed while underway approximately 50nm SW of Sao Tome Island. Alarm raised, crew mustered and SSAS activated. As the skiff closed in, hooks and a ladder were noticed, and the pirates fired upon the tanker causing damage to the accommodation. Master increased speed and commenced evasive manoeuvres, resulting in the skiff aborting the attack and moving away. Crew and ship safe.  

So Will Instability in Europe Lead to An Increase in International Naval Presence in the Gulf of Guinea?

At present we have seen a number of western naval units deployed into the Gulf of Guinea.  Units of the Italian, Danish and British (even Russian) navies have all operated in close cooperation with the Nigerian Navy and other indigenous regional navies and have actively prevented acts of piracy on the high seas.  Multinational exercises also bring foreign vessels into the region and foreign vessels pass through on visits and liaison missions, however, there is still little momentum behind the creation of a standing naval force for the Gulf of Guinea among extra-regional powers.  This may be driven by local political drivers and a feeling among indigenous navies that allowing a permanent international naval presence might be seen as an abrogation of their duties and an admission of failure in dealing with the piracy issue.  

It must also be remembered that instability in Europe would most likely be brought about by a conflict which in turn would likely result in most European naval assets being held back in home waters to generate presence and a capability to respond to potential aggression or escalation of any conflict.  

Given this, any deployment of assets to secure the Gulf of Guinea would likely be limited to smaller vessels such as the Offshore Patrol Vessels, i.e. vessels like HMS Trent which recently deployed to the region from the UK.  However, without any basing rights and/or an established partnering relationship with at least one indigenous navy, even deployment of OPV might require a fleet logistics vessel to operate in support.  This might be achievable if the force were a multinational force, but it would still take a valuable asset away from much higher priority tasks in European waters.

In the absence of a western naval presence, it is possible that we might witness non-NATO nations filling the void, possibly with the Chinese paying greater attention to the region.  It is already rumoured that China has reached an agreement with at least one Gulf of Guinea nation to allow the basing of Chinese vessels in the region.  The unanswered question is, how will Chinese – or any other foreign naval units – operate in the region?   Will they be working as an autonomous force-based locally, or will they work in partnership with and under command of indigenous navies?

In the short term, we will likely see very little foreign activity in the region as all the key maritime nations address problems closer to home.   However, in the event that Europe needs to replace lost Russian gas supplies, we could easily see a greater effort by EU countries to address the security challenges faced by commercial shipping off the West African coast.  We have seen such a response in the past when the shipping lanes through the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa became so heavily plagued by piracy that it impacted western economic interests.  The same might apply in the Gulf of Guinea in the event of any long term loss of equilibrium in Europe.

UK commits to Security and Defence Partnership with Nigeria

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The National Security Advisors of both the United Kingdom and Nigeria hosted the inaugural dialogue in support of the Security and Defence Partnership between 31 January and 2 February 2022, in London. 

Here are some of the commitments the United Kingdom made in the communique published shortly after:

Police Reform

The United Kingdom commits to provide a package of assistance in support of policing reform in Nigeria, which will include technical assistance, training and advice, alongside exploring opportunities to support models of post-conflict policing in conflict-affected areas.

 

North East Security

​​The United Kingdom commits to continue its support for the Lake Chad Basin Regional Stabilisation Facility’s work to improve civil-military cooperation in North-East Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad Basin region, including through the provision of expert assistance. The United Kingdom also commits to continue its support for community-led security and peacebuilding in North-East Nigeria.

 

Human Rights

The United Kingdom commits to continue providing training for the Nigerian military on international humanitarian law, sexual exploitation and abuse, and the protection of civilians. This will also include training on human rights and sexual and gender-based violence for the Police in North-East Nigeria. 

The United Kingdom reaffirms its support for long-term defence modernisation and transformation in Nigeria, and, in support, offers a refreshed package of leadership training for Nigerian military training institutions and the continuation of a training offer that builds understanding of international human rights and international humanitarian law.

 

Maritime Security

The United Kingdom will continue to offer support to build Nigeria’s maritime capabilities, continue to support both the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum/SHADE mechanism and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct framework, and continue to collaborate with Nigeria on enhancing port security.

 

Terrorism

The United Kingdom also commits to work with Nigeria through the delivery of a new Prevent pilot programme to address the drivers and enablers of serious and organised crime. 

In support of this commitment, the United Kingdom offers to share their experience of delivering a multi-agency approach in response to terrorist incidents. The United Kingdom also offered to share insight on terrorist financing, trans-border movements and the illegal movement of small arms and light weapons.

The UK reaffirmed its offer to support the completion of the National Risk Register through the Emergency Planning College and offered to support Nigeria to refine its counter-terrorism crisis response preparations. 

A write-up of the meeting can be read by clicking here.

The full UK Govt communique can be found by clicking here.

South Korea – Increasing Focus on Security in the Gulf of Guinea

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Attack on Korean owned Vessel

At approximately 2315 hrs UTC on Monday, 24 January 2022, the Marshall Islands-flagged product tanker MT B Ocean was boarded while drifting approximately 59 NM SSW of Abidjan (Click to read the full report).  Between nine and eleven pirates armed with guns boarded and hijacked the tanker.  All crew members were taken hostage and held initially on the bridge before being moved to the crew mess area.  All communication and navigation equipment was switched off and the bosun was instructed to paint over the vessel name written on top of the bridge (This is possibly a reference to the IMO number that all vessels are required to have on the uppermost level of the superstructure). 

The pirates were heard communicating with a probable mother vessel before they then navigated the tanker using their own GPS equipment to rendezvous with another vessel.  While en route, the bosun was told to prepare the manifold where the ship-to-ship transfer (STS) operation commenced.  Once the tanker had rendezvoused with the second vessel, the chief officer and bosun were told to commence ship-to-ship (STS) operations.  After approximately six hours, the cargo transfer concluded, and the second vessel departed.  Before leaving the tanker, the hijackers stole crew cash, personal belongings, and ship’s properties.  The Korean owners, Ocean Marine Holdings Co Ltd care of manager SK Shipping Co Ltd of Seoul, South Korea, operated the vessel as a bunker vessel.

History of Attacks on Korean interests

South Korea, although not the most frequently impacted nation by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, has a growing presence in the region and an increasing frequency of being victimised by maritime criminals in the area.  The following are some of the events relating to S Korean assets and interests in the region:

2013 – 03 February.  Oil Product tanker MT Gascogne, hijacked off Ivory Coast.  Lost contact with the vessel since 0800hrs UTC on Sunday, 3 February, off Cote d’Ivoire 70nm south of Abidjan. Luxembourg flagged and French-owned, the vessel was on charter to South Korea’s SK Shipping.  The vessel and 17 crew were released on 06 February. 200 tonnes of its cargo of diesel fuel was stolen, and two crew members were injured.

2016 – 11 February.  Combined chemical and oil tanker MT Maximus was hijacked by 6 armed pirates off Cote d’Ivoire approximately 76nm South of Abidjan. Five crew reportedly kidnapped as the remaining crew secured in the safe room. On 17 February, MAXIMUS was lying more than 200nm off the Nigerian coast.  It was suspected that she was waiting for a receiving tanker to arrive at an RV position.  The next day at around midday it was reported that she was alongside another tanker some 60nM off the coast of Akwa Ibom.  The vessel’s crew of 18 comprised of mariners from India, Pakistan, China, South Korea, Sudan, and Ghana.

2018 – 26 March.  Two Ghanaian flagged fishing vessels Marine 711 and Marine 707 were attacked by Nigerian sea pirates while operating 27 nm from South Cape Saint Paul/Anloga, Ghana.  The attackers left the vessels on 28 March taking five mariners with them (Captain, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer of Korean nationality, other two are Ghanaian and Greek).  On 28 Mar 2018, the Owners confirmed that the fishing vessel has been released and it is sailing to a safe port. Three crew members were reported missing. 

2020 – 03 May.  Senegalese-flagged fishing vessel Amerger VII 36nm off Libreville, Gabon.  Three crewmen were kidnapped – two Senegalese and a South Korean.  On 6 June, pirates released the six hostages after receiving a ransom.

2020 – 24 June.  Ghanaian flagged fishing vessel, FV Panofi Frontier was boarded by an unknown number of attackers approximately 60nm South of Cotonou.  Two skiffs were seen in the vicinity. The attackers kidnapped six crew (five South Koreans and one Ghanaian) and escaped. The 5 South Korean victims were released on Friday, 24 July 2020 in Nigeria.

2021 – 19 May.  Ghanaian flagged tuna fishing vessel FV Atlantic Princes was boarded 65nm South of Tema resulting in the kidnap of 5 crew – Captain- Korean, Chief Officer- Chinese, Second Officer – Chinese, Chief Engineer – Chinese, Bosun – Russian. 

2021 – 31 May.  Ghanaian flagged fishing vessel FV Iris S, IMO number 8210493, was attacked by armed men in two speedboats, forced to stop, and then boarded 108nm South Cotonou.  Stole ship’s and crew property as well as kidnapping five members of the crew; Captain, Chief Officer, Second Officer, and Chief Engineer – all S. Korean and the Engineer – a Filipino.  

 

Expanding Economic and Security Ties between South Korea and Nigeria

South Korea has significant economic interests in the region, primarily in the energy and construction sectors, which in the case of the latter, Nigeria accounts for more than half of South Korea’s foreign construction sales in Africa. (Read more here)

In August 2021, during a visit to the region, South Korea’s First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Choi Jong Kun, said maritime safety in the Gulf of Guinea “is a very important issue to us”.  While briefing journalists in Abuja on the outcome of his visit to Nigeria he went on to say “I met the (Nigerian) transport minister, Rotimi Amaechi and he informed me of what the Nigerian government is doing to ensure maritime security.  Transnational security is a very important issue to us, especially safety in the Gulf of Guinea”.(Read more here)

Confirming that South Korea would be hosting the Korea-Africa forum in December 2021, he revealed that he anticipated an expansion of cooperation between his country and African states, saying discussions and collaborations would expand in many areas, including economy, trade, and culture.

Furthermore, The Nigerian Minister of Transportation, Rotimi Amaechi, stated on 22 August 2021 that the Federal Government of Nigeria will collaborate with the Republic of Korea on some aspects of the Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure also known as the Deep Blue Project (Read more about it here).  A statement also signed by Eric Ojiekwe, Director, Press and Public Relations quoted the Minister as saying. “We met in my office and discussed quite a lot that has to do with maritime relationships, especially the Deep Blue Project. We concluded to collaborate, and he promised some support and assistance from the government of the Republic of Korea”. 

The First Vice Minister, expressing concern about the expansion of maritime kidnapping in the region, went on to confirm his country’s interest in the Deep Blue Project.  Referring to his country’s strong fishery and maritime presence in the region, he stated that South Korea was concerned about the security risks posed by operating in the region, saying “So, we want to partake in securing our fishing industry in the Gulf of Guinea whereby cooperating with the Government of Nigeria. That we will do”.

Promising to support the Nigerian government in tackling maritime insecurity, the diplomat disclosed that the Korean government would host a joint commission with Nigeria in October 2021 in Seoul, Korea, saying “We want the Minister of Transportation to be part of the Joint Commission so that in Seoul, we will talk about maritime security on the Gulf of Guinea.”

Further evidence of the growing importance of the region to South Korea can be seen in their recent donation of a security vessel to Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project, noting the transfer of this vessel is currently delayed due to financial constraints within the Nigerian Maritime Administration & Safety Agency (NIMASA).  

 

Summary

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a cause for great concern among all seafaring nations but particularly among those with significant economic interests such as South Korea.

With investment in the energy sectors increasing in the region (particularly in the LNG sector which is increasing in significance due to events in Europe), potential opportunities for South Korean companies will continue to increase.  With this however will also come pressure for countries such as Nigeria to ‘raise their game’ with regards to dealing with piracy.   

Indeed, now that South Korea has joined the ever-growing list of countries offering assistance to combat the region’s security challenges from piracy, the pressure to address the fundamental and underlying causes of the piracy problem in the region, especially in Nigeria, will be greater than ever.  

UPDATE: Aviation workers have suspended strike

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On Monday, February 7th, we published a news update (click here to read it) about proposed strike action by Nigerian aviation worker unions including the National Union of Air Transport Employee (NUATE), Air Transport Services Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ATSSSAN),  Association of Nigeria Aviation Professional (ANAP).

However, due to a meeting held with the unions, the strike action has been suspended. The following screenshots show the outcome of the meeting as posted by @Eonsintelligenc on the microblogging platform Twitter.

The union leaders had earlier said: “Our Unions variously issued ultimatums to the Federal Ministry of Aviation and the six aviation agencies over the vexed issues of failure to release negotiated Conditions of service of the Agencies since 2013 and non-implementation of Minimum Wage/Consequential Adjustment since 2019. All the ultimatums expired 31st January 2019 without the demands being met in any form.”

 

Aviation workers in Nigeria to go on strike

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According to the latest news reports, Nigerian aviation worker unions including the National Union of Air Transport Employee (NUATE), Air Transport Services Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (ATSSSAN),  Association of Nigeria Aviation Professional (ANAP),  have threatened to ground flight operations nationwide on Tuesday, 8th of February.

According to Comrade Ocheme Aba, General Secretary, NUATE,  Comrade Frances Akinjole, Deputy General Secretary, ATSSSAN, the Ministry of Aviation and the aviation agencies have refused to implement the Minimum Wage and Consequential Adjustment since 2019.

The unions’ leaders said: “Our Unions variously issued ultimatums to the Federal Ministry of Aviation and the six aviation agencies over the vexed issues of failure to release negotiated Conditions of service of the Agencies since 2013 and non-implementation of Minimum Wage/Consequential Adjustment since 2019. All the ultimatums expired 31st January 2019 without the demands being met in any form.”

Read the full news report here.

EU Pledge to Continue GoG Presence

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The European Union (EU) has announced that it intends to carry on with the deployment of its member states’ warships in the Gulf of Guinea to stem the recurring menace of piracy.

This announcement comes after a review of the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) pilot program. The program has facilitated the deployment of warships by EU member states to the Gulf of Guinea since 2020. 

The EU is also proposing a two-year extension of the CMP mandates starting January this year and has outlined deployments of Danish, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish warships into the region.

According to news reports, Denmark will patrol West Africa’s waters for four months, Spain for seven and a half months, France for eleven months, Italy for eight months, and Portugal for three and a half months. The deployment will ensure a continuous EU presence in the Gulf of Guinea with at least one ship in the area.

“The Gulf of Guinea continues to be particularly dangerous for seafarers. None of the coastal navies, with the partial exception of Nigeria, can operate the required high-sea patrol boats to respond to attacks,” said an EU External Action Service memo addressed to the Political and Security Committee of the EU.

Read the full article by clicking here.

Global Maritime and Piracy Report 2021

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The Maritime Information Cooperation and Awareness Center (MICA Center) of the French Navy has released its 2021 annual report on maritime piracy and robbery acts that impacted worldwide maritime security. 

The report notes that for the Gulf of Guinea, Illegal Fishing, Illegal immigration, and Drug Trafficking are the main factors impacting maritime security/piracy in the region. Our latest #AreteDeepDive (published here) touched on how these threats may develop in the coming months and we will be discussing this more in future articles. 

According to the report – 317 acts of maritime piracy and robbery were recorded worldwide in 2021 by the MICA Center. A decrease of 15% compared to 375 in 2020, with the most noticeable decrease recorded in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa. In 2021 the Caribbean and Singapore  Strait were the most affected areas for incidents. 

The report notes that whilst the figures to 31st Dec 2021 seem to show a  decline in incidents in the region, the main season for incidents runs from Oct to April and thus this decline cannot yet be assumed to be a  continuing threat. 

You can read more on the report by clicking here.

Gulf of Guinea Maritime Crime – 2022 Expectations

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In the last quarter of 2021, Arete released two deep-dive analyses of the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea over the 2021 period.  These analyses covered some of the key takeaways, events, and incidents of the 2021 period namely;

  • The significant reduction in reported maritime crime and piracy incidents across the region, particularly in coastal waters off Nigeria;
  • The continuation of boardings and thefts in anchorages;
  • The continued shift to deepwater operations, outside Nigerian territorial waters and EEZ, with Pirate Action Groups (PAGs) using medium-small to medium-sized vessels as mother ships;
  • The focus on the kidnapping of mariners, with numbers of victims per attack being generally higher than in previous years;
  • The increasing recognition of the strategic importance of the region among extra-regional nations;
  • Linked to the above, an increasing international naval presence in the region;
  • The launch of the NIMASA / Nigerian Navy Deep Blue project;
  • The disruption and capture of suspected pirates by the Danish Navy.

So what will change or emerge in 2022?

There are a number of key factors that can affect the way the maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea may evolve including;

  • Where – Where will the pirates go next and what is the geospatial trend?
  • What – What will the pirates focus on, and will they develop a new business model?
  • When – When will the pirates strike, i.e. are current trends likely to change?
  • Who – Who will be the main actors in the region going forward?

Firstly, let us consider the likely geographic hot spots in 2022.  Historically, the pirate gangs have concentrated their activities in certain areas until such time as the security environment changes and those areas become high(er) risk for the pirates to operate in forcing them to shift to a new area.  

Such a shift was seen in 2011 when pirates moved from targeting vessels and oil platforms in the shallow waters of the Niger Delta fan, a littoral shelf lying south of the Niger Delta, to targets in the adjacent waters of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea.  This shift was met with a robust response by the Cameroonian security forces resulting in the pirates then shifting their activities to the waters off Benin, Togo, and Ghana.  

This see-saw shift repeated itself a number of times until the pirate groups changed their modus operandi to the use of mother ships which enabled them to operate in deeper waters further offshore.  This also allowed them to operate far further from their main bases in the Niger Delta and the Bakassi Peninsula.  This model has persisted today as exampled in 2021 where gangs are witnessed operating off Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe.  

Recent operations by warships from outside the region have changed the operating environment in the central and eastern Gulf of Guinea and therefore it is possible that the early months of 2022 will see a switch across to the waters to the west of Nigeria – potentially as far west as Ivory Coast or Liberia, i.e. where the security environment is more permissive and the offshore industry is ramping up, presenting an increasing number of potential targets of opportunity.

It has also been postulated that pirate groups will be scared off the high seas and into the riverine systems of the Niger Delta, e.g. the November 2021 attack on a work crew from AGIP in Bayelsa State is already being viewed as evidence of this hypothesis (noting we do not believe this to be the case as per our previous #AreteDeepDive which you can read here).  The action by the Danish Navy in November 2021 has also generated much speculation about whether patrolling by international navies will drive the pirates from the seas into the riverine areas of the Niger delta.  

Ultimately it should be appreciated that pirate groups have suffered setbacks in the past, notably in Cameroonian waters in 2010 and more recently in 2020.  Nigerian pirate groups are resilient and readily adapt to changes in their operating environment and this single event is unlikely to dampen their enthusiasm to pursue the rich pickings to be gained from large-scale kidnap for ransom operations.

Thus, our assessment is that any spike in activity in the riverine environment will more likely be driven by other factors, i.e. relating to onshore issues, rather than due to a step-change in the security environment offshore.  Ultimately, Nigeria is suffering from escalating inflation, placing further pressure on populations that are already victims of grinding poverty.  Other socio-political drivers are also generating a worsening security environment throughout the country and the Niger Delta is no exception to this trend. (Read more about this here)  It is established beyond doubt that riverine crime and other crimes on coastal waters are driven by such factors, so in a situation where people are suffering increasing hardship it is likely that crime levels will escalate including in the maritime domain.  

One interesting development in the last few days has been the freeing of the suspected pirates taken on board the Danish Frigate (read the story here), noting the Danish authorities were unable to find a single country in the Gulf of Guinea that was prepared to take them into custody.  This led to calls from several international maritime organisations and shipping bodies for Gulf of Guinea states to take responsibility for punishing pirates in their own courts. Read more about the incident by clicking here and here, (noting a fourth detainee was treated in a Ghana hospital before being taken to Denmark where he appeared in court on 07 January 2022 – Read the full story by clicking here.). The outcome of his trial will likely determine the future of international action in the region in 2022 (this will be analysed in further Arete Deep Dives).

Read More: Gulf of Guinea Piracy, a symptom not a cause

In summary, it is assessed from events last year that the tempo of pirate activity will likely escalate in the first half of 2022.  The attacks will likely occur more than 150 nautical miles from Nigeria’s coastline and will occur to both the east and west of Nigerian waters.  The pirate groups will test the capability of the Deep Blue project and possibly also the resolve and reach of international navies operating in the region.  The resolve of western navies will also have been affected by the inability of the Danish authorities to convince a regional state to prosecute the three suspected pirates on one of their frigates potentially lessening the international community’s motivation to involve themselves in piracy matters in the region in the future.  Indeed, this failure will likely embolden the pirates and generate uncertainty among the western navies operating in the region.

On this basis, it is believed the pirate groups will maintain and possibly increase the tempo of their activities.  Whether that tempo will be maintained throughout the year will become evident.  The geographic concentration of activity will also be revealed in time and will potentially swing between two or more areas. 

Over the last two years, pirate groups have proven their methodology and logistic systems in the taking, holding, and releasing of large numbers of kidnap victims.  It is likely they will continue to develop these capabilities and is therefore possible that we will see single pirate action groups taking even larger numbers of victims in each deployment. 

Conversely, the long-awaited Deep Blue Project has been operational for six months now.  However, we have yet to see the full effectiveness of the multiple systems and capabilities deployed under the project’s umbrella.  If the Deep Blue Project proves to be successful, we will likely see it push the pirates into more peripheral areas and make it harder for other criminal gangs to operate in coastal waters.  

In past years, pirate action dropped off in the middle four months of the year as sea conditions made small boat operations untenable.  However, the shift to the use of mother ships has given the pirates the potential for all-weather, year-round capability.  This will likely remain unchanged in 2022.

The major pirate groups in the region, believed to number between four and six, will remain predominantly sponsored, led, and manned by Nigerian nationals.  That notwithstanding, we have seen such groups operate out of neighbouring countries with the support of Nigerian diaspora fishing communities (noting the Cameroonian authorities clamped down very heavily on such activity in Cameroon).  However, Nigerian fishing communities also exist in other regional states, and it is possible these communities will provide support to the pirate groups, adding further reach and endurance to their operations.

Conclusion

Piracy is a lucrative and proven business model in the region.  The more serious and most well-organised gangs are unlikely to be deterred by the launch of the Deep Blue Project or the presence of international warships in the region as the risk vs reward still mainly swings in their favour.  

Therefore, it is likely that piracy will expand across the region in 2022 and the risk of kidnap will continue to remain very high for mariners in waters as far as 300 nautical miles from the Nigerian coast.  Finally, the inability or lack of will among regional states to prosecute the suspected pirates captured by the Danish Navy could further increase the risk of piracy in the region.