Trump 2.0 – What Does it Mean for Africa?

The imminent arrival of President Elect Donald Trump in the White House is anticipated to trigger significant change in US foreign policy. This analysis presents a snapshot of the key issues that may impact Africa, with a focus on how the new administration may interact with African nations and the wider continent during President Trump’s next four years in power.

During his first term, President Trump’s approach to dealing with Africa could be characterised as indifferent, nevertheless, he remained a pragmatist and pursued economic and trade deals with African states when they were advantageous to the US and imposed restrictions on trade when it was directly harmful to the US.

Noting that US foreign direct investment in Africa decreased significantly during his last term in office, i.e., from $50.4 billion in 2017 to $43.2 billion in 2019, trade relations with African states actually improved reaching US$40.9 billion before sliding to US$32.7 billion when the pandemic hit in 2020.

This economic stance, coupled with a hostile immigration policy (President Trump’s stance on restricting immigration, particularly from Muslim countries, was a mainstay of his last election victory as well as with his latest one), arguably led to a diminishing of US influence across the continent.

If this is not to be repeated more focus will be required from the new Trump administration noting it will be facing a far more complex global political and economic landscape than during President Trump’s first term in office.
Noting China’s ever increasing Foreign Direct Investment, President Trump is also likely to focus on containing and reducing China’s economic expansion, as well as that of other competitors in the BRICS group of nations, and this will likely manifest in his administration pursuing economic interests in African markets far more than his last term in office.
One key area of note is the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2025. This current free trade deal will possibly be abandoned in favour of transactional bilateral deals with individual states, allowing President Trump to pursue his “America First” policies more selectively. African nations that are rich in resources, such as the major oil producing nations of Nigeria and Angola, will likely remain the focus of US trade policy.

From a security perspective, and noting President Trump’s “America First” stance, it has been speculated that his administration may be less inclined to interfere in African states where human rights and democracy abuses may be taking place. This approach may serve to weaken political accountability, and negatively affect governance standards where democracy is already weak or absent.

With regards to regional threats from terrorism, during his first term in office, the US maintained a robust counterterrorism presence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Much of the US effort in the Sahel has now ended or reduced in scale, however Trump 2.0 could see a new focus and increased military support for regional counterterrorism initiatives. This might see Washington focus on key allies including Nigeria and Kenya, but will probably not include US ‘boots on the ground’.

In conclusion, Trump 2.0 will likely force numerous African nations that are secondary to US interests to look inward as US aid and engagement shrinks – noting President Trump’s favouring of investment over aid. This will force African leaders to reconsider strategic partnerships, particularly how best to secure investment, maintain political stability, to address the continent’s long-term development needs through inward-looking strategies. In the long-term, this may be advantageous for Africa, driving the development of democracy, statecraft and economic strategy in many countries. However, the short term is likely to be very bumpy for a number of nations.

#AreteUpdates: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

At 0100hrs yesterday (11th November) a vessel was boarded south of Brass, with 5 crew reported kidnapped. As yet the vessel name is unconfirmed and details of the attack remain unknown. This is the latest incident to have been confirmed in the Gulf of Guinea noting that since the issuance of the IMB report (end of Q3, Sept 2021) there have been an additional 5 reported piracy incidents that have taken place, including the MSC Lucia which was boarded and where the crew was then rescued/assisted by a Russian Navy vessel which was conducting patrols in the area. You can read about that incident here. On the same day, a second container ship was also believed to have been boarded with unconfirmed reports of the potential kidnapping of 3 crew, along with another incident in Conakry where armed pirates boarded an anchored vessel and stole laptops and computers. 

At the beginning of November, a passenger boat was attacked in Bayelsa State; the attackers opened fire forcing the vessel to stop, then boarded and stole passenger’s belongings (read here). This appears to show the increase in attacks that we would usually expect to see in the last quarter of the year, although potentially this has been somewhat delayed this year compared to previous years.

The IMB report raises some interesting points and the huge coverage in local and international media of the efforts being undertaken by both Governments/military in the region as well as international assistance may well be acting as a deterrent for some attackers. However, we must view these in the context that this report only accounts for incidents reported to IMB. In Q3, they show only 5 incidents reported; whereas our intelligence at Arete shows 11 in the same period. 

Taking the 11 reports we have witnessed for Q3, 9 were successful (robbery, boarding, attempted boarding) – an 82% success rate.

Reported/non-reported incidents aside, what is very clear is that whilst reported incidents may be down, the level of violence has not reduced in the Gulf of Guinea, with the region accounting for the 2 vessels fired upon and the hijacking and all 51 crew kidnapped globally in the period. These statistics/incidents are what owners, charterers, etc should be most aware of as these are what impact voyages and, more importantly crews. 

Contact us at info@arete-group.com to discuss the services we offer to mitigate these risks.

 

Nigerian Court Sentences 10 Pirates to 12 Years

Last week, we published an #AreteDeepDive analysis on the importance of a milestone conviction of pirates in Togo and what it means for shipping operators in West Africa. You can read the article here.

In the article, we predicted that the ruling could lead to meaningful sentences being handed down in the future across the region, and on July 23 it was reported that a Federal High court in Lagos, Nigeria sentenced 10 pirates to 12 years imprisonment for abducting the crew of a Chinese-flagged vessel (full article on the landmark convictions here).

Our prediction aside, this latest sentencing in Lagos, Nigeria could mean the tide is changing positively for security on West African waters, or alternatively, it could just be regional politics in play with states not wanting to be seen to be ‘lacking’ when compared alongside their neighbours. Continue to follow #AreteDeepDive for further updates and analysis on this developing situation.

Please email us at info@arete-group.com if you are trading in the Gulf of Guinea; we are constantly monitoring the situation in the region, and provide services to companies operating offshore, inshore and onshore. These services include embarking Risk Management Consultants (RMCs) on clients’ vessels and platforms offshore to coordinate Security Patrol Vessel (SPV) activity and provide training and drills for your crews in counter-piracy.