#AreteUpdates: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

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At 0100hrs yesterday (11th November) a vessel was boarded south of Brass, with 5 crew reported kidnapped. As yet the vessel name is unconfirmed and details of the attack remain unknown. This is the latest incident to have been confirmed in the Gulf of Guinea noting that since the issuance of the IMB report (end of Q3, Sept 2021) there have been an additional 5 reported piracy incidents that have taken place, including the MSC Lucia which was boarded and where the crew was then rescued/assisted by a Russian Navy vessel which was conducting patrols in the area. You can read about that incident here. On the same day, a second container ship was also believed to have been boarded with unconfirmed reports of the potential kidnapping of 3 crew, along with another incident in Conakry where armed pirates boarded an anchored vessel and stole laptops and computers. 

At the beginning of November, a passenger boat was attacked in Bayelsa State; the attackers opened fire forcing the vessel to stop, then boarded and stole passenger’s belongings (read here). This appears to show the increase in attacks that we would usually expect to see in the last quarter of the year, although potentially this has been somewhat delayed this year compared to previous years.

The IMB report raises some interesting points and the huge coverage in local and international media of the efforts being undertaken by both Governments/military in the region as well as international assistance may well be acting as a deterrent for some attackers. However, we must view these in the context that this report only accounts for incidents reported to IMB. In Q3, they show only 5 incidents reported; whereas our intelligence at Arete shows 11 in the same period. 

Taking the 11 reports we have witnessed for Q3, 9 were successful (robbery, boarding, attempted boarding) – an 82% success rate.

Reported/non-reported incidents aside, what is very clear is that whilst reported incidents may be down, the level of violence has not reduced in the Gulf of Guinea, with the region accounting for the 2 vessels fired upon and the hijacking and all 51 crew kidnapped globally in the period. These statistics/incidents are what owners, charterers, etc should be most aware of as these are what impact voyages and, more importantly crews. 

Contact us at info@arete-group.com to discuss the services we offer to mitigate these risks.

 

Nigeria Shuts Down DPR

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Following the passing into law of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA), which was signed into law by President Buhari on 16 August 2021, the Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR) will now be replaced by a new agency.  Together with the Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), and the Petroleum Equalisation Fund (PEF), the DPR has been scrapped to be replaced by the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NPRA), and the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission (NURC).

These fundamental changes to the regulatory structures that govern the Nigerian oil sector are of specific interest to oil and gas operators, service companies, and security providers that provide services to those companies.   In the security sector, service providers also require permits from the DPR to deliver services.  These permits are a legal requirement to operate legitimately and without them, they cannot legally support oil and gas sector clients.

There has been some speculation as to what will happen to these permits when the DPR ceases to function and how oil and gas providers will continue to operate during and after the transition.  Received wisdom from within the DPR indicates that existing permits will remain valid until their projected expiry date.  At that point, they will be replaced with new permits issued by the successor organisation.

The process for this will remain an online application and submission of supporting documentation.  Fees will also be paid online.  If this transition goes according to plan, there should be no interruption to service delivery by security providers.   Arete will continue to monitor the situation closely and keep all our clients informed of any changes in the projected transition.

You can read more about the closure here.

Piracy Drop reports from Gulf of Guinea – Is this Progress?

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There is a general acceptance among maritime security analysts that the Gulf of Guinea has witnessed a reduction in piracy and maritime crime in 2021 as compared with previous years.  

The International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that in the month of June 2021 just four incidents of successful or attempted attacks on vessels were reported.  This compares very starkly with the same month in the previous four years which saw 13 incidents in 2017 and 31, 21 and 14 incidents in 2018-2020 respectively.1  

The Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade: Gulf of Guinea (MDAT) biannual report for the first half of 2021 listed a total of 38 incidents in the region.  This compares favourably with the total of 68 reported for the equivalent period in 2020.

Despite this apparent fall in the number of incidents, the Gulf of Guinea is still the most active hotspot in the world for maritime kidnapping and hijacking.  Data held by Arete analysts indicates that in 2020, more than 150 mariners were abducted in the region, 99 of which were abducted in the waters of countries other than Nigeria.  Thus far, in 2021, the same data shows that 56 mariners have been abducted from vessels outside Nigerian waters and 13 taken from passenger boats on the Bonny River.  This apparent elimination of maritime kidnapping from Nigeria’s coastal waters is a very positive development, However, the long-range attacks continue to persist.

The key question is whether this is an anomaly or a reflection of a significant change in the threat levels in the region.  If we look just at open-source statistics, there does appear to be a significant reduction in the levels of activity.  But is that the whole picture?

IMB Statistics show a total of 22 incidents reported in 2021 in Nigerian waters.  Data gathered by Arete analysts for Nigerian waters show a total of 7 (7) in January, 5 (6) in February, 4 (7) in March, 1 (2) in April, 1 (3) in May, 1 (2) in June, 1 (2) in July, 1 (1) in August and 2 (0) in September.  Note: the number in brackets shows the number of incidents recorded by Arete in the region outside Nigerian territorial waters and Economic Exclusion Zone. 

This very quick comparison of statistics reveals a fundamental problem in the reporting of security incidents – that of definitions and categorisation.  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) records incidents using a methodology very similar to that used by Arete 2  and includes riverine activity on navigable inland waterways as well as distinguishing between coastal waters and deep offshore activity.  

In contrast the IMB only records incidents against ships that are internationally registered and therefore almost all the riverine activity and much of the activity in territorial waters continues to go unrecorded.   This is an important consideration, as many groups that use riverine crime to build up their funds and to obtain additional boats and engines then progress to attacks on commercial vessels in coastal waters.  Thus, the overall picture serves to generate sometimes valuable warning and indication of an emerging capability for a group that will then expand its operations to impact on commercial shipping.  Additionally, a lot of activity against commercial fishing vessels occurs inside the 12-mile limit and many of these incidents are unreported as the vessels are only locally registered.

While these different methodologies and reporting criteria serve their own purpose in that they support the information requirements of the bodies compiling the data, the resultant understanding of the threat can sometimes vary quite significantly.   Whilst this might lead to varying perceptions concerning the rate of criminal activity, there is a consensus among analysts that the overall levels of reported activity have fallen quite significantly in 2021.  So why is this?

Causes

Under-reporting of activity is complex.  It can be driven by variables in reporting criteria from one organisation to another.  However, and of greater significance, it can also reflect systemic weaknesses in the platforms and communications channels used to report activity.  Furthermore, there are commercial and sometimes political factors that also result in under-reporting of incidents.

Commercial shipping is vulnerable to heavy costs if a vessel is delayed in a port.  Thus, many incidents are reported to a vessel’s Company Security Officer but not to a local port authority.  The concern is that a vessel could be delayed for considerable periods if it is declared a scene of crime by a littoral state’s law enforcement bodies.  Furthermore, a vessel’s history and projected routes will be factored in to setting insurance premiums.  Even crewing costs might be affected if a vessel has an established history of incidents.  

It is sometimes speculated that littoral states manage the threat picture very carefully to manage costs of shipping goods through busy ports.  There is currently great concern among politicians and maritime bodies in Nigeria that the continuing application of War Zone surcharges against commercial shipping insurance disadvantages their maritime trade and impacts on the onshore economy as costs are passed on to customers.

The above factors can generate a picture that falls short of the reality and security analysts have for several years believed that the actual rate of incidents involving shipping is significantly greater than that reported in open sources.

The UNODC raises the question of whether there has been a reduction in the levels of support offered to the pirate and criminal gangs among their host riverine communities in the Niger Delta.   This is an interesting consideration as all piracy emanates from onshore communities.  The UNODC report points out that the riverine armed robbery gangs have a different relationship with host communities, compared to a gang operating deep offshore.  The latter will often disburse some of their profits among sections of the community, thus buying favour, whereas a riverine armed robbery gang will often have a heavy negative impact on its host or neighbouring communities.  

This is reflected in Rivers State where, in July 2021, after a hiatus of 7 months, we witnessed the return of armed attacks against passenger boats on the Bonny River.  The impact on travellers using the waterways is heavy, with deaths, abduction and financial loss being the normal consequences of such attacks.

We have also seen an evolution in the capability and behaviour of the more organised criminal gangs.  The UNODC report speculates that between four and six organised crime groups (OCGs) now operate deep offshore, conducting most of their attacks outside the Nigeria EEZ in the waters of neighbouring countries, or international waters.  This reflects the acquisition of vessels that are now used as motherships, which reflects the vastly increased levels of investment into the equipment and vessels required by the gangs to operate at such distances.  

The implication is that the gangs now have serious backers with deep pockets.  It is likely that these funds originate in the huge amounts of money disbursed by the Federal Government of Nigeria as part of its Niger Delta Amnesty program as well as the multi-million-dollar contracts awarded to companies owned by former Niger Delta militants.  

The increased operating range of these groups, as well as the higher capacity to take and detain abducted mariners on mother ships, means the gangs have also evolved their modus operandi but also their expected revenue streams.  Thus, ransom rates for mariners kidnapped deep offshore have been inflated and now far outstrip the ransom rates for riverine passengers and mariners abducted in inshore waters. 

We have witnessed a significant change in the operating range of Nigeria based pirate groups in the last two years.  They now readily operate around 200NM from nearest landfall.  These groups have much greater endurance and can remain at sea for weeks rather than hours or days.  They have also, as described above, acquired the capacity to hold greater numbers of abducted mariners, which means the same group might now be responsible for multiple attacks within a single operation.  These groups will attack opportunistically when in transit between their long-range operating area and their home bases in Nigeria.  However, this increase in range sometimes leads to a misperception that the threat is somehow decoupled from the overall threat in Nigerian Waters whereas in reality, it is a significant increase in the severity of the threat.  

The capacity and confidence to hold larger numbers of captives at sea for prolonged periods has generated a kidnapping trend which contradicts the overall incident trend numbers.  The number of mariners abducted in the region has steadily increased, with data from the MDAT showing the total number of abductees increasing from 37 in 2015 through 54 (2016), 60 (2017), 99(2018), 146 (2019), and 142 (2020).  

This contrast with the falling overall number of incidents indicates a shift in targeting and the ‘business model’ adopted by the pirates.  Clearly, their aim now is to acquire funds through fewer operations that have a higher capacity to generate revenues – more abductees per incident.  

Ransom values have also increased substantially when associated with the long-range pirate groups, with ransom payment more than 10 times the 2008 value according to data provided by UNODC.  A further indication of the increasing sophistication of the kidnapping industry is evidenced by a single reported case of a ransom demand being made using Bitcoin as the payment currency. 

This use of mother ships allows the gangs to reduce their time at sea and allows them to operate in areas where the indigenous navies have lower capabilities than those of the Nigerian Navy, both of which reduce their exposure. This operating profile also allows them to operate a more advantageous economy of scale than previously.   The overall effect is to make their ‘businesses’ leaner and more profitable.

If we separate the activities of these deep-water groups and focus on inshore piracy and armed robbery, we see a slightly different picture.   While the deep offshore threat is expanding, that of the inshore gangs seems to be contracting.  Setting aside the problem of under-reporting, there does seem to have been a reduction in activity levels.  We have seen almost no reports of boardings in the Lagos anchorage and few reports of similar activity in the ports of Lagos or Onne.  Furthermore, there is a significant reduction in reported attacks on coastal shipping and riverine commerce.  So, what has changed?

The Nigerian Government and Nigerian Navy have attributed this significant change to the program of equipment procurement for the Navy and the launch of the Deep Blue project, which is claimed to have the capability to monitor coastal activity along the entire seaboard of the country.   

The commissioning of the Deep Blue system may well have had an effect on the maritime dynamic in Nigeria’s coastal waters, particularly the integrated surveillance and response capability that has the potential to change the operating environment for both commercial shipping and maritime criminals.

It is still probably too early to say conclusively whether its launch has achieved the aim and it might be that the reduction in coastal activity levels is entirely coincidental and driven by other factors.  We have yet to see the system’s full capability demonstrated in a coordinated interdiction of a criminal group, but we cannot rule out the possibility that its mere existence has served to deter criminals from going to sea.  

In time, as the various maritime bodies in Nigeria learn how to operate the system to its optimum capacity, we might see the coastal waters actively patrolled and aggressive, intelligence-led interdiction of maritime criminals at sea.  The system will only come into its own however if it is fully integrated with other capabilities – onshore intelligence gathering and security forces operations to disrupt or detain criminal gangs.  To achieve this, the Nigerian authorities will need to overcome inter-agency rivalries and generate truly integrated operations based on intelligence fusion centres and agile decision-making structures that can deploy the right response, to the right place, in the right timeframe.

One other factor that has possibly impacted on the overall security of the region is the ever-increasing international interest in the region.  2021 has seen the deployment of several foreign naval assets to the region, including warships from Italy, France, the USA, and most recently from the UK.  HMS Trent recently arrived in Lagos with a team of Royal Marines on board (see our previous article here).  The latter specialise in cross-decking, boarding, and interdiction operations.  It is intended that they will conduct several training exercises with indigenous navies during their five-country, three-month deployment.  This reflects the UK government’s acknowledgment of the region as a strategically vital region for commerce.  Japan has also pledged to invest $260,000 in training and other programs to support efforts to combat piracy in the region.

Regional cooperation and information sharing among indigenous navies is evolving – but very slowly.    Numerous summits have been held over the last decade, and they invariably conclude with ambitious statements about international cooperation.  Unfortunately, as genuine as these ambitions are, they are rarely enabled; protectionism and vested interests undermine the results.  However, there is an incremental improvement in the amount and effectiveness of international cooperation.  This is driven by economic reality and, over time, will generate greater effectiveness in cross-boundary/border operations.

Other factors should also not be ignored, and these include the links between criminality and the electoral cycle in Nigeria.  Historically, as an election approaches, acquisitive criminal activity increases.  This is true of the maritime domain as well as onshore, with historical links between spikes in inshore criminal activity and the generation of electoral funds for some campaigners in the coastal states of the country.  Currently, Nigeria sits in mid-term, which has generally seen a lowering of maritime criminal activity.  However, as the next election approaches, we should expect to see an increase in robbery, hijacking and kidnapping in Nigeria’s waters.

Additionally, we have recently seen greater efforts by the courts of Ghana and Nigeria to pass down meaningful sentences to criminals convicted of acts of piracy and maritime armed robbery (see our piece on a recent Togolese court ruling here).  Whilst it is normally the low-ranking ‘foot soldiers’ who are captured and tried, the imposition of long jail terms on those convicted might serve to loosen tongues and reveal the sponsors and patrons behind the pirate gangs.  In the short term, this could weaken the resolve of the low-ranking actors and serve as a warning to the men in the background.  In the long term, this could result in the exposure of a senior sponsor behind one of the gangs – although any resultant prosecution would require considerable political will if the prosecution is to be successful.

 

While there does appear to be a reduction in piracy according to open-source data, anecdotal information suggests that significant numbers of incidents are not reported.  It is not possible to say whether this reporting gap is contrived or simply attributable to systemic challenges.  It is also hard to say whether the under-reporting has escalated, although the percentage of successful attacks within those reported has increased, which would indicate again that more are not being reported.  What can be determined is that the threat to mariners in the region remains severe, with the risk of kidnapping being higher in Gulf of Guinea waters than anywhere else in the world.  Additionally, the region hosted all of the world’s hijackings in 2020-21.  

Finally, as we approach the end of the year, we should expect to see the annual trend of a spike in maritime criminal activity in the run-in to Christmas and other end-of-year festivities.  The next few weeks will be informative insofar as if the downward trend is maintained then we might need to consider the possibility that a fundamental shift has occurred.  However, if we see a spike in activity, it might suggest that the reduction in activity rates this year might be anomalous or just a temporary lull. 

Therefore, Arete recommends that commercial shipping organisations maintain their existing states of preparedness and countermeasures.  Ship Security Officers and Company Security Officers should ensure their vessels are compliant with the requirements of the ISPS Code and adhere to the recommendations enshrined in Best Management Practices 5.  Arete is ready to assist and support with our full range of maritime risk management solutions – including Security Operations Support provided from our 24/7/365 Joint Operations Centre located in Lagos, Nigeria. 

 

[1] ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the period 01 Jan 2021 – 30 Jun 2021

[2] UNODC – Pirates of the Niger Delta: Between Brown and Blue Waters

 

 

Travel Updates – Nigerian entry requirements

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South Africa and a few other countries have been removed from the red list of arrivals in Nigeria.
The slides below show the latest travel updates necessary for proper planning.
Reach out to us at info@arete-group.com if you require assistance with travel management.

Arete ISO Accreditation Renewed!

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We are delighted to announce that our ISO accreditation has been successfully renewed in line with international standards. ISO is one of the most rigorous and well-regarded standards in the world and our accreditation once again demonstrates our commitment to maintaining the very highest standards of service delivery.   

At Arete, we understand the importance of following best practices in everything we do and our dedicated team will continue to ensure you enjoy the very highest risk management service levels.  Arete is internationally accredited to the highest international standards including ISO 9001; ISO 18788; ISO 45001; ISO 14001 and ANSI/ASIS PSC 1.

Our Managing Director, Sven Hanson MBE said;

” “Arete” is a concept that, in its most basic sense, refers to excellence of any kind.  This concept is bound to the notion of the fulfillment of purpose or function – the act of living up to one’s full potential – and the striving towards that potential or purpose.  At Arete we strive endlessly to deliver our risk management services to our clients to the very highest of standards, at all times, in order to protect them from the range of Quality, Health, Safety, Security, and Environment (QHSSE) risks they face”.  He adds: “I am extremely proud of our team for this achievement, which not only reflects the hard work and continuing commitment to quality within Arete but also serves to demonstrate our commitment to delivering the very best possible service levels to our clients.” 

Royal Navy to join security forces in the Gulf of Guinea

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On the 10th of August, we published news that the US Navy vessel USS Hershel “Woody” Williams arrived in Lagos, Nigeria as part of the U.S. government’s support to help combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. According to news reports, the U.K. has also joined in this effort. Royal Navy patrol ship HMS Trent is reported to be setting sail to the Gulf of Guinea to undertake security patrols and a mission to support allies in West Africa.

Becoming the first Royal Navy vessel to operate in the area for three years, the deployment is meant to demonstrate the UK’s commitment to being more persistently engaged in the region as international efforts are concentrating on improving security in the Gulf of Guinea after a very violent 2020, which included an increase in kidnappings from commercial vessels.

The Maritime Executive reports that during her deployment to the Gulf of Guinea, she will also conduct maritime security patrols as well as support partner navies by helping them to develop key maritime skills and develop plans for future operations in the region. HMS Trent carries onboard a contingent of Royal Marines from 42 Commando, which will train partner forces across the region in skills like boarding and searching of suspicious vessels, as well as evidence handling and medical skills. The team is trained in boarding operations which will help the fight against illegal activity like piracy, drugs-smuggling, and terrorism.

“This deployment demonstrates how Britain is stepping up on the world stage to tackle shared international security challenges,” said the U.K.’s Armed Forces Minister James Heappey. “Working hand-in-hand with our allies we are utilizing our forward-deployed Armed Forces to tackle threats at the source, making the world a safer place for all.”

You can read the full Maritime Executive article here – Royal Navy joins Maritime Security effort

 

#AreteQuarterly – Top 7 threats to Nigeria’s security

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The Security Risk Spectrum in Nigeria

Following a recent article by the BBC on the top 5 threats currently facing Nigeria, we have given our on-the-ground view in this article. We will be publishing articles such as this quarterly. Over the last 3 months, we have touched on some of these potential threats already, but in this first #AreteQuarterly we look in even more detail at how these tie together due to common causes, how this could affect travellers or employees in different regions and what you can do to ensure you and your colleagues stay safe.

Nigeria is a large country with the largest population in Africa.  Despite the fact that it is the largest economy in Africa, unemployment runs at 32.5%[1] and poverty is widespread through much of the country[2], which if measured against the World Bank’s income poverty threshold of $3.20 per day means 71% of the population is living below the poverty line.  These conditions of severe economic hardship generate social stresses that may be pushing people into criminality out of necessity, i.e. they end up committing crime out of need, not greed.

It is important to understand that criminality in Nigeria is dynamic and diverse. No single area of the country – even down to local government areas – presents a homogenous map of criminality.   Groups emerge and fade away almost on a weekly basis.  They might operate on a very localised basis or, in the case of the more organised crime groups, across administrative boundary lines.  Criminal groups are territorial and will fight one another for control of the areas with the richest pickings.

There are also established linkages between various social groupings and crime, with organisations such as the National Union of Road Transport Workers and the numerous confraternities being regularly linked to various criminal activities.  Corruption and nepotism also facilitate crime, creating a permissive environment where criminals operate under the umbrella of their patrons who provide the ‘top-cover’ that protects gangs from the forces of law and emboldens them.

The final factor that contributes to high levels of insecurity is the massive overstretch and under-resourcing of the police and other law-enforcement agencies.  The security agencies strive to bring criminals to court but are often frustrated when the judicial system appears unable to convict or to award punitive sentences that would deter others.

Geographically, the areas of highest risk – those with the greatest number of reported incidents – are the north-western states of Kaduna, Niger, Zamfara and Katsina, where banditry and kidnapping are the principal threats.  Borno State in the north-east still suffers a high number of security incidents, with at least 95 major incidents reported in 2021 to date, the vast majority of which are terrorist in nature.  The Niger Delta region is the next most predated area of the country, with Imo, Delta, Edo and Rivers the most affected.  The commercial capital of the country, Lagos, suffers a lower but steady rate of criminality.  Ikorodu Local Government Area is the most lethal part of the state.

It is instructive to look at various aspects of the risk spectrum individually, as they morph continually and present the security forces with an ever moving and changing target array.  However, it must also be stressed that figures quoted by all sources are incomplete as many incidents go unreported.

Terrorism

The jihadist insurgency in north-east Nigeria has seen several evolutions since the inception of Boko Haram in 2002.  The almost two decades since then have seen the Islamist group fade after its original leader died in police custody in 2009.  However, it bounced back with increased capability and capacity in 2012, following which it captured and controlled most of Borno State and adjacent areas of neighbouring states, forming the caliphate that Boko Haram aspires to.  That resurgence saw the group fracture into smaller groups, including Ansaru, which evolved into the Islamic State in the West African Province.  Currently, Boko Haram is undergoing another split following the killing of its leader, Abubakar Shekau, in a suicide bombing attack in May 2021.

The insurgency has displaced more than 2.3 million Nigerians, triggering a humanitarian crisis and a worsening case of food poverty that impacts beyond the areas immediately affected by the insurgency.

The various groups have different aims – the core of Boko Haram wants a unitary Islamic state in Nigeria with assimilation of territory in neighbouring nations.  ISWAP has a broader Islamist agenda that aims to create a much larger Islamic caliphate across the Sahel and sub-Sahelian regions of West and Central Africa.  Both these major groups use classic insurgency tactics of attacks on security forces, intimidation of the local population, extortion and kidnap for ransom to raise funds and also imposition of levies/taxes on local communities.  Foreigners, particularly westerners, are prime targets for abduction and murder, with international aid organisations also targeted in an effort to hinder their operations and prop up the local population’s dependency on the ‘benevolence’ of the jihadis.

While the government security forces continually claim to have defeated Boko Haram, the insurgency persists.  Furthermore, while it is true Boko Haram may be losing some of their influence (there are credible reports of hundreds of fighters surrendering in recent weeks), their hard-core members will likely have aligned with ISWAP and will continue the fight.  ISWAP will likely continue to focus on attacking security forces and international targets, with the latter requiring robust security packages and a healthy philosophy towards risk acceptance in order to continue to operate in North-eastern Nigeria.

Banditry

Numerous commentators have linked the jihadism with the perennial conflict between pastoralist Fulani herdsman and arable farming communities.  There are some shared characteristics, but the herdsmen are simply perpetuating a behaviour that is almost as old as the grasslands they graze.  The migratory herds follow the grass, encroaching further south as the dry season progresses.  It is an eternal dynamic that is found throughout the Sahel and sub-Sahelian regions of West, Central and East Africa.  Whilst it is technically wrong to classify these groups as terrorists, the nature of some of their attacks are almost identical to those of true terrorist groups that follow a political or faith-based goal.

Other bandit groups are prolific in the north-west of the country, specifically in Kaduna, Niger, Zamfara and Katsina States.  Several arterial routes through this region present extremely high levels of risk for travellers including the commercially vital route between Abuja and Kaduna.

Bandit groups operate illegal roadblocks and checkpoints from where they conduct robbery operations and opportunistic kidnappings of people perceived to be of wealth or high status.  This type of activity presents a particular threat to business travellers unless they travel with a large, heavily armed escort team.  Thus, air travel is preferred and the advised means of travel in this part of the country.  Other bandit tactics include raids on rural communities where they conduct looting and mass kidnapping operations.  This presents a lower level of threat for international employees/travellers, but can impact on workforces for agricultural, power and mining projects led by international companies.

Kidnapping

The “kidnapping industry” in Nigeria has expanded massively in the last 6 years.  Previously a significant threat in the Niger Delta and, to a lesser extent Lagos, kidnapping is now widespread and common throughout the country, with the rate of incidents and the number of victims per incident constantly increasing.   Geographically, the North-West, North-East and Niger Delta are the most prolific areas for kidnapping, with the highest numbers occurring in the North-West.  The raison d’etre behind the kidnapping threat also varies according to location and group.   In the South-South, most groups are driven purely by pecuniary considerations.  They tend to operate as closed groups, with the entire operation carried out from within a small circle of knowledge and using established infrastructure and methodologies.  Kidnappings in the South-South and other parts of the southern half of the country tend to be more targeted and organised, with the gangs conducting relatively sophisticated reconnaissance and pattern of life studies before the snatch occurs.

In the North-West, by comparison, the attackers are more likely to be loose groupings of bandits who sometimes will carry out only part of the operation – some snatching the victims, others holding them and others conducting the ransom dialogue.  Often in the north of the country, schools are targeted in mass-kidnapping events.  This is probably driven by an economy of effort and the knowledge that the pupils will mostly come from privileged families who have money.  Young women and girls are vulnerable to forced marriage in such instances.

Currently, the kidnapping graphs are all showing steep increases across the country and will remain a major threat to personnel for the foreseeable future.  This is unlikely to change, even in the face of an increasing number of states adopting the death penalty of kidnappers.

Kidnapping presents a significant threat to international employees, indigenous executives and notable persons within society.  For those who fall into these groups, consideration should be given to the use of private security and armed protection teams.  This must be accompanied by a thorough understanding of the threat, up to date intelligence and a high level of application of personal security best practices.

Separatism

The South-East is gripped by a separatist crisis generated by the Indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB), whose aim is to create an autonomous or independent state of Biafra (see our previous article here).  The aim is widely supported among the Igbo people of the region, but that support is far from universal, with many feeling that IPOPB attracts unwanted attention from the security forces who interfere with normal commercial life and rhythms of society in the region.  Imo State is the most affected by the separatism, with Orlu Local Government Area becoming the epicentre of attacks by the so-called ‘unknown gunmen’ and reprisal operations mounted by the security forces.

This challenge does not target international personnel directly, but the risk of being in the wrong place at the wrong time is significant in such a high tempo environment.

It is likely that the separatists will step up their attacks while the leader of IPOB, Nnamdi Kanu, remains in custody (link to our previous article).  If Kanu is convicted and jailed, they will mount a campaign to keep his name in the media spotlight and also increase their attacks on security forces as they attempt to demonstrate their resilience and determination to achieve their aims.

In the South-West, the nascent Yoruba Nation movement, led by Sunday Adeyemo, known as Igboho after his place of birth, is gaining attention following the arrest of Adeyemo and his ongoing detention in Benin Republic.  He has a history of agitation and involvement in disorder going back to 1997 and there is a strong streak of ethnic bigotry and Yoruba supremacy running through his rhetoric and previous actions.  The Yoruba Nation is agitating for an independent Yoruba state in the South-west which will see it control the commercial hub of Lagos and major international trading routes along the West African littoral.

It is likely that the Yoruba Nation will continue to agitate through the medium of protests and rallies rather than take up arms as IPOB has in the east.  These activities are unlikely to present a direct threat to international personnel or operations, but the ethno-nationalist tendency in their manifesto could lead to localised violence against indigenous employees from other tribes and ethnic groups.

Oil Militancy

Oil militancy emerged in the Niger Delta in 2006.  An armed insurgency carried out primarily by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) saw oil exports and revenues more than halved during the three-year campaign that led to the October 2009 Presidential Amnesty Program.  The insurgency was by no means homogenous, with numerous groups that affiliated with the MEND and in some cases which competed and clashed with MEND.

Following the amnesty, and the retirement (or deaths in some cases) of most of the major militant leaders, there followed a period of relative stability until 2016, when the Niger Delta Avengers burst onto the scene with a series of high profile and high impact attacks on key nodes in the region’s pipeline infrastructure (see our previous article on the recent threats made by the NDA).  The following 12 months saw numerous groups emerge, with the number peaking in late 2016 with a total of at least 58 groups declaring their existence.   Many of these groups had no real capability to mount attacks and were simply opportunists wanting to take advantage of any further round of amnesty payments, however some had clear capacity and capability to severely disrupt oil and gas (and shipping) operations in the region

Throughout the period since the 2009 amnesty, pipelines in the region have been ravaged by relentless hot-tapping operations and industrial scale theft of crude oil and condensate.  Illegal refineries were found throughout the region, causing immeasurable environmental damage and economic loss to the oil companies whose product was being stolen and the communities whose land and waterways were being destroyed by pollution.

An interesting development is the emergence of a new group calling itself the Movement for the Emancipation and Defence of Niger Delta, MEDND[3].  This group issued a warning that they would avenge the death of any person killed in Delta State by herdsmen.  The group appears to have the backing of the Ijaw kingpin, Chief Edwin Clarke, who was intimately associated with MEND in its day.  He is currently the leader of Southern and Middle Belt Leaders Forum, SMBLF.

Oil militancy is closely associated with sea piracy (see below), with groups operating in both capacities out of the same camps.  The oil militants regularly threaten international companies’ operations in the region, usually with a warning that personnel are not the target and should be evacuated before a given deadline.  There is little doubt that certain groups are present in the region whose threats are more than empty rhetoric and retain the capacity and intent to carry out attacks.  Threats published by militant spokesmen and warnings gained through credible intelligence sources should always be treated with great caution and the requisite risk reduction measures implemented as necessary.

Oil militancy will not go away in the near future.  The cartels stealing the crude and condensate make millions of dollars per month from their illicit activities.  They enjoy the patronage of men of influence who provide top-cover, and this has led to a situation where a status quo has been reached.  Thus, the flow of money – and from it power – into the region through illegal activities is likely to persist as long as the oil reservoirs remain productive.

Sea Piracy

The Gulf of Guinea is currently recognised as the most high-risk area for mariners anywhere in the world.  The situation grew out of the oil insurgency in the first decade of this century and it has evolved into a highly efficient operation that generates millions of dollars every month through hijacking, extortion, armed robbery and kidnapping on the high seas. Virtually all piracy in the region is linked to Nigeria and the majority to the coastal and swamp areas of the Niger Delta.

The gangs have, over the years, proven to be resilient and adaptable.  They now enjoy the advantages of operating over a huge area, with their operations now being mounted from mother ships that hunt their victims up to 200 nautical miles from nearest landfall.  This creates a massive challenge for the region’s navies, who suffer from lack of integrated intelligence gathering and response capability. Additionally, they seem able to adapt to any initiative mounted by the Nigerian Navy, and others in the region, whereby they simply change their modus operandi or operating footprint.

An example of this is seen in the last two years, when we have seen the emergence of groups that have developed the capacity to hold kidnap victims at sea, either on mother ships or vessels that have been hijacked – sometimes apparently for the sole purpose of holding a number of kidnap victims.

This threat remains potent and real for mariners operating in the region.  It is hoped that the Deep Blue project will have a positive impact, but regional cooperation and a more pragmatic approach to the use of private security will enhance any advantage gained from Deep Blue.

Petty Crime

Street crime, burglary, theft from motorists and motor vehicles and armed robbery are endemic in the urban areas of Nigeria.  These crimes are driven largely by desperation and need rather than acquisitive greed.

Petty crime will never go away in Nigeria (or any other country) and the only thing personnel can do is to educate themselves about the risks and the strategies they can adopt to reduce their profile and the attendant likelihood of being victimised.

Summary:

Clearly there are a multitude of threats and associated risks to businesses and individuals working and visiting Nigeria, however as with all risks these can be mitigated through the adoption of appropriate risk mitigation measures.  As a highly accredited, professional risk management company, Arete is able to provide whatever support is necessary to ensure your safety and security and to protect you from physical, financial and reputational loss.

 

 

 

[1] https://www.statista.com/statistics/1119227/forecasted-unemployment-rate-in-nigeria/

[2] https://theconversation.com/nigerias-poverty-profile-is-grim-its-time-to-move-beyond-handouts-163302

[3] https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/06/militants-reply-herdsmen-vow-to-repel-attacks-on-delta/

War Risk Insurance – NIMASA expresses optimism

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In June we reported that NIMASA had requested the international maritime community to remove, or reduce, war risk insurance on Nigeria bound cargos.

This week, the Director General of NIMASA, Dr. Bashir Jamoh, met with the Executive Secretary of the Nigerian Shippers’ Council (NSC), Hon. Emmanuel Jime, and stated that he believed the continued reduction in maritime incidents seen over the last few months should lead to the removal of the insurance premiums and in an official statement following the meeting he noted that “…the sharp decrease in maritime incidents logged in IMB’s second quarter report was a valuable feedback on the NIMASA’s campaign for Nigeria’s delisting from countries under the war risk insurance burden”.

With the initial statement on the subject from NIMASA in June, Lloyds List released a response soon after stating that there were currently no plans to amend this premium and at this time we await further international response to this latest statement from the DG of NIMASA.

Worth note is while the DG referred to the IMB Q2 report for 2021 piracy showing a decline in incidents compared to 2020, Q2-Q3 have historically shown a lower rate of incidents in Nigeria due to natural factors such as weather conditions etc. and thus the international community may well need to see evidence of a decline in piracy in Nigeria for at least the next 6 months before considering any re-classification.

The removal of this insurance would obviously have huge benefits to everyone involved in the maritime trade in Nigeria (according to the non-profit Oceans Beyond Piracy’s 2020 report, the total cost of additional war risk area premiums incurred by Nigeria-bound ships transiting the Gulf was $55.5m in 2020 alone.), however any removal will likely only be predicated upon a corresponding drop in the risk of pirate attack.  We will continue to monitor for further updates.

You can read more on the meeting and statement here – NIMASA anticipates end to War Risk Insurance

 

Automating Nigeria’s Ports – #AreteNews

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There are several challenges affecting maritime trade in Nigeria. One major issue is congested ports which leads to delays and costs millions of naira in wasted time and long delivery times.

In an interview with This Day Business, the Acting Managing Director of Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), Mohammed Bello Koko, spoke about the plan to automate the ports better using the Eto, an electronic truck call-up system that was deployed in February 2021 by the Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA).

On the Eto system, having experimented with a manual truck scheduling arrangement for over a year, the authority has introduced an electronic truck call-up system in February to streamline truck movements and eliminate traffic congestion in and around the port area. The system is to be rolled out in Lagos where Nigeria’s two busiest ports are situated and will effectively see all trucks doing business at the port in Lagos required to park at approved truck parks until they are called up into the port through an app called Eto.

The Eto application is for the scheduling, entry, and exit of cargo trucks into the port, and truck companies, terminal operators, and freight agents will be required to download the app, and then proceed to create an account to monitor the schedule and movement of their trucks.

You can read more about it here – “Full Automation of Ports is our Goal” 

At Arete, we provide risk management services to companies operating offshore, inshore and onshore.  These services include embarking Risk Management Consultants (RMCs) on clients’ principal vessels and platforms offshore. Send an email to info@arete-group.com

COVID: Nigeria High Commission in London shut down

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The Nigeria High Commission in London has shut down its operation for 10 days after two of its officials tested positive for Covid-19. This closure means all visa processing is now suspended until further notice. However, BVN processing continues. 

One of the officials returned positive after the test was administered on him when he went for a meeting at the Home office.

As a result, the Mission embarked on testing all officials after which another official tested positive.

While regretting any inconvenience the shutdown of operations might cause, the Mission in a statement said the move is to check the spread by ensuring that those who were in contact with the affected persons observe the mandatory isolation.

It reads, “This afternoon the Head of Immigration Section and two other officials went for a meeting at the Home Office.

“At the entrance, Covid test was administered on them and one of them tested positive to Covid-19. The affected officer immediately isolated while the other officials, who tested negative will also isolate for the next 10 days.

“In response to the challenge, the Mission embarked on testing all officials of the Mission, after which another official of the Mission tested positive.

“In line with Covid-19 regulation and the need to adhere to the rules and regulation of the host country, the Mission will close down for the next 10 days, in order to observe the mandatory isolation of those who were in contact with the affected officials.

“While the High Commission regrets any inconvenience that this may have caused, we solicit the cooperation of the general public.”

Please email us at info@areteafrica.com for any assistance you may need with travel planning in the coming weeks and months. We will continue to monitor the situation and provide further information on visa processing activities as they become available.

Link to the full Vanguard article here