President Trump 2.0| Ukraine and wider European Security

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On 20 January, 2025, Donald Trump will return to the White House as the second President to do so after a hiatus in the role.  The four years that Trump spent out of power witnessed huge geopolitical developments that must be addressed by the incoming US administration.  The most obvious challenges for Trump’s Foreign Policy is the Russian invasion of and continuing war in Ukraine, and the crisis in the Middle East, which just this week has taken on a new complexity given the collapse of the Assad regime in Damascus and the sudden departure of Russian and Iranian surrogate forces from Syria. This report will focus on the Ukraine invasion and wider European security issues.

The Politics of European Security

During his first presidency, Trump revealed an isolationist instinct that put ‘America First’.  This posture included statements that were unsettling, but perhaps justifiable, in his stance towards the NATO alliance.  He made it clear that all member nations of the Alliance should meet their treaty obligation to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence.  During his election campaign in 2024, he reiterated this position and escalated the rhetoric when he said that the US would not honour its Article 5 obligations to come to the defence of any nation that failed to meet the 2% of GDP threshold.

In parallel with this strategy of deliberate uncertainty, Trump stalled any package of military support for Ukraine for 8 months after the Russians invaded.  This is largely believed to be a legacy position after his warm meeting with Putin in 2018 and the resultant détente between the two leaders.  However, despite lifting the blockade on military aid, Trump’s support was never clear, and uncertainty was the characterising feature of the relationship with Kyiv.

So what of European security as a whole? The recent enlargement of NATO upon accession by Finland and Sweden means that NATO’s European nations can field armies that would significantly outnumber Russia’s conventional forces, in addition to them having a vastly superior military industrial base.  Experience of combat operations in Ukraine indicate that in a purely conventional conflict, Europe and NATO could more than hold its own against Russia, without the US’s assistance.  This is concept, however, is inherently dangerous, as in the event of a US withdrawal from NATO, there would be no strategic counter to Russia’s immense arsenal of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.  With regards to Russia, Moscow perceives European defence as being fragmented and atrophying, and moreover Putin’s imperial ambitions are unlikely to be constrained or even ended by any deal that Trump might impose upon him – especially while Trump threatens the cohesion of NATO.

So What Will Trump Do About Ukraine?

As we enter Trump 2.0, the President Elect’s position on a resolution of the war in Ukraine remains ambivalent.  The influential Heritage Foundation published a paper titled Project 2025, in which it suggested that Europe should shoulder the responsibility for containing Russia while the US focusses on constraining China.   This means support for Kyiv will likely be limited to military aid, but not to an extent that it becomes economically punitive for the US; in February 2024, Trump said that support to Ukraine should be viewed as loans and all aid should be repaid eventually.

Trump has repeatedly stated that he will very quickly end the war in Ukraine.  This, in the context of his perceived leanings towards the Kremlin, is interpreted by most as meaning that he will exert pressure on Kyiv to adopt terms with Russia that will be brokered by Washington.  However, both Putin and Zelensky have issued red-line statements that suggest neither will be receptive to terms proffered by Washington.

It is likely that Trump will accept Russian demands to hold on to Crimea and all territories gained since its invasion in 2022.  He is also likely to block Ukraine’s future attempts to join NATO.  He could also threaten to withdraw the US from NATO if Europe resists this strategy.  Zelensky is unlikely to accept a peace deal without an open door to future NATO membership, especially in light of his recent interview where he stated that the hot phase of the war could be stopped if Ukrainian territory he controls could be taken “under the NATO umbrella” – allowing him to negotiate the return of the rest later “in a diplomatic way”

Conversely, in order to put pressure on Putin to accept the deal, Trump could remove all remaining constraints on the use of western weapons by the Ukrainian armed forces.  This will not ensure a Ukrainian victory, but it will ensure that Russia cannot win.

In this scenario, an essentially frozen conflict will likely become increasingly frustrating for Washington, potentially leading to a complete cessation of military aid to Ukraine.  The resultant boost to Russian confidence will likely generate increased aggression in Ukraine as well as along other borders with NATO countries.  This will place a huge burden on Europe as its nations struggle to fund rearmament and expansion of its armed forces.

However, a recent meeting brokered by President Macron of France saw Trump and Zelensky meet in Paris during the ceremonial reopening of the rebuilt Notre Dame cathedral.  Zelensky described the meeting as “productive”.   If Trump were to feel the necessity to put pressure on Putin and were to open the floodgates of support, and deliver everything Ukraine has asked for without restraint, a Ukrainian victory might just be possible – especially given the increasingly unstable Russian economy and growing dissent against the war among its population.

Meanwhile, Europe should expect an escalation of Russia’s campaign of sabotage, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns across the continent, including electoral influence operations as seen most recently in Romania.  Europe is now facing a greater threat than at any time since 1945;  Trump could make or break that situation.

Trump 2.0 – What Does it Mean for Africa?

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The imminent arrival of President Elect Donald Trump in the White House is anticipated to trigger significant change in US foreign policy. This analysis presents a snapshot of the key issues that may impact Africa, with a focus on how the new administration may interact with African nations and the wider continent during President Trump’s next four years in power.

During his first term, President Trump’s approach to dealing with Africa could be characterised as indifferent, nevertheless, he remained a pragmatist and pursued economic and trade deals with African states when they were advantageous to the US and imposed restrictions on trade when it was directly harmful to the US.

Noting that US foreign direct investment in Africa decreased significantly during his last term in office, i.e., from $50.4 billion in 2017 to $43.2 billion in 2019, trade relations with African states actually improved reaching US$40.9 billion before sliding to US$32.7 billion when the pandemic hit in 2020.

This economic stance, coupled with a hostile immigration policy (President Trump’s stance on restricting immigration, particularly from Muslim countries, was a mainstay of his last election victory as well as with his latest one), arguably led to a diminishing of US influence across the continent.

If this is not to be repeated more focus will be required from the new Trump administration noting it will be facing a far more complex global political and economic landscape than during President Trump’s first term in office.
Noting China’s ever increasing Foreign Direct Investment, President Trump is also likely to focus on containing and reducing China’s economic expansion, as well as that of other competitors in the BRICS group of nations, and this will likely manifest in his administration pursuing economic interests in African markets far more than his last term in office.
One key area of note is the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2025. This current free trade deal will possibly be abandoned in favour of transactional bilateral deals with individual states, allowing President Trump to pursue his “America First” policies more selectively. African nations that are rich in resources, such as the major oil producing nations of Nigeria and Angola, will likely remain the focus of US trade policy.

From a security perspective, and noting President Trump’s “America First” stance, it has been speculated that his administration may be less inclined to interfere in African states where human rights and democracy abuses may be taking place. This approach may serve to weaken political accountability, and negatively affect governance standards where democracy is already weak or absent.

With regards to regional threats from terrorism, during his first term in office, the US maintained a robust counterterrorism presence in Africa, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Much of the US effort in the Sahel has now ended or reduced in scale, however Trump 2.0 could see a new focus and increased military support for regional counterterrorism initiatives. This might see Washington focus on key allies including Nigeria and Kenya, but will probably not include US ‘boots on the ground’.

In conclusion, Trump 2.0 will likely force numerous African nations that are secondary to US interests to look inward as US aid and engagement shrinks – noting President Trump’s favouring of investment over aid. This will force African leaders to reconsider strategic partnerships, particularly how best to secure investment, maintain political stability, to address the continent’s long-term development needs through inward-looking strategies. In the long-term, this may be advantageous for Africa, driving the development of democracy, statecraft and economic strategy in many countries. However, the short term is likely to be very bumpy for a number of nations.

Gulf of Guinea Neighbours Seek International Court of Justice Ruling

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On Monday, 30 September 2024, Equatorial Guinea asked judges at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague to reject Gabon’s claim to a group of islands in Corisco Bay, which straddles the international land border between the two countries.  The island of Mbanié, with an area of just 74 acres, is the largest of three small islands that are the centre of the dispute.  The dispute arose in 1972 when, following a military confrontation, Gabon ejected Equatorial Guinean troops and occupied the island, posting a small military garrison which remains to this day.

Following years of UN mediation, in 2016 both countries agreed to abide by the outcome of a dispute resolution process in the ICJ.  Hearings concluded recently having begun in 2021.

Teams of legal experts representing the two nations contested the other’s claim based on the relevance of two historical treaties.  Equatorial Guinea’s claim is based on a colonial era treaty signed in 1900 which divided French and Spanish colonial assets in West Africa.   Gabon cites the 1974 Bata Convention to back its own claim, but Equatorial Guinea says the document Gabon has offered as proof for the 1974 agreement is unsigned and not an original.  Equatorial Guinea’s Deputy Minister for Mines and Hydrocarbons, expressed frustration with Gabon’s claims, stating: “None of [the Equatorial Guinean delegation] had seen or heard of this supposed agreement… The document presented was not the original, but just an unauthenticated photocopy”. Marie-Madeleine Mborantsuo, honorary president of Gabon’s Constitutional Court, defended Gabon’s position, emphasizing that the 1974 Bata Convention had been sent to the French ambassador, which she argued was standard diplomatic practice. She urged the ICJ to recognize the validity of the document. The court will deliver a final and binding ruling in 2025.

What Is At Stake

Although both countries have significant oil and gas industries, the waters around the Mbanié island group are believed to have further valuable oil and gas reserves and for both countries the economic benefits of expanding their reserves would be politically and economically significant.

Enjoying investment and the injection of technical expertise, primarily from Mobil, Equatorial Guinea expanded its oil sector over several decades, becoming the third largest oil producer in Africa in 2005 with the second highest GDP per capita in the world.  Equatorial Guinea now seeks to diversify its economy as a matter of urgency but, to avoid economic stagnation, it is important for the Obiang regime to continue to develop the oil sector.  The demographics of the country have shifted though, and despite the wealth the oil sector has brought to the country, increasing urbanisation and rampant nepotism have driven increasing poverty among people not directly employed by oil and gas companies.

Gabon has enjoyed similarly impressive growth in its oil and gas sector.  Prior to the 2011 formation of the national oil company, Société Nationale Petrolière Gabonaise, the country’s production was in the hands of international companies including Shell, Perenco, Total and Addax.  By 2018, Gabon had overtaken its neighbour to become the third largest producer in Africa. By 2020, Gabon Oil had conducted a number of auctions of oil block licences.  However, it will not start to see revenues from these blocks until 2025 at the earliest.

How is the ICJ Likely to Rule

The ICJ will rely on precedent to settle the dispute.  However, there are two options they may adopt and the outcome is uncertain.  They could rule that the international land border will be projected offshore on the same bearing as it follows at the point it meets the coast, or it might settle for extending the international maritime border perpendicular to the coastline.  Just a few degrees of orientation will have massive territorial implications for both countries, so although they have both agreed to abide by the ruling, one or other is likely to be dissatisfied with the outcome. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have both emphasized the peaceful nature of their dispute, with officials from both countries expressing hope that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling will finally resolve the decades-long territorial disagreement. It is expected that both will respect the court’s decision – in the short term at least.

The International Dimension

International interest in the region is growing. China is courting both countries with the aim of establishing a strategic naval base for the Chinese Navy in the Gulf of Guinea.  Washington is concerned by this, although they have not yet issued any formal statement or comment, and is using its economic and diplomatic power to lobby both governments against offering basing rights to China.

Economically, Western IOCs have significant investment in the region.  The decision of the ICJ will potentially determine the viability of future investment or even continuation operations by some of these companies.

The risk of armed conflict is low, but in the event of hostilities, Gabon enjoys a numerical advantage over its neighbour onshore.  However, the Equatorial Guinean Navy is stronger than its Gabonese counterpart.  Any conflict is likely to be short lived and localised but could disrupt the region’s current strategic balance and drive one or other country to rapidly reach a decision about basing rights for foreign navies.

We will of course keep monitoring this situation and provide updates over the coming months in this ongoing story.

Proposed Gulf of Guinea Pipeline – Challenges and Opportunities

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The recently signed agreement between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea to develop a gas pipeline between the two countries offers significant economic and social development opportunities. The pipeline will enhance the regional network, connecting Equatorial Guinea to the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) and proposed international trans-Saharan pipelines and moreover will allow surplus Nigerian gas to support industrial growth in Equatorial Guinea. It was reported that this could be the precursor to a recent initiative to build pipelines across the Gulf of Guinea region, linking littoral and inland nations to promote hydrocarbon usage and help industrialise the continent.

In Nigeria, previously proposed pipelines have faced strong opposition, particularly from Niger Delta communities who feel marginalized and who are often forced to endure energy poverty, with no mains electricity, while “their” gas is exported. This resentment has previously led to threats of attacks on pipelines, reflecting the region’s deep-seated frustrations. Recent examples include Niger Delta militants threatening to blow up gas pipelines exporting gas from the region to Lagos State and the Dangote refinery during its construction). These threats never materialised, but in July 2024 a group calling itself Host Communities of Nigeria Producing Oil and Gas (HOSTCOM) warned of renewed agitation if the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and International Oil Companies (IOCs) do not address local demands.
While this specifically applies to crude oil, it illustrates how the population regards itself as a serious stakeholder in the country’s oil and gas sector. Exporting gas to another country could magnify this resentment and lead to attacks on associated infrastructure in onshore areas of the Niger Delta as well as lead to protest and unrest in coastal communities disrupted or displaced to make way for the onshore infrastructure for the pipeline.

Local companies available to build the pipeline will be keen to ensure they win a share of the contracts worth millions of dollars, however these contract awards can also attract risk in the region, with corruption and nepotism frequently triggering incidents in order to influence or in response to the outcome. In October 2023, the Reformed Niger Delta Avengers (RNDA) threatened to resume attacks on oil pipelines, accusing the NNPC of side-tracking indigenous Niger Delta contractors. In another example, the sub-sea pipeline linking Exxon’s offshore operations off the coast of Akwa Ibom State was damaged mid-July 2016, causing a force majeure lasting several months. It was subsequently revealed that the line had been attacked with explosives, although this was never acknowledged by the company.

While the project is still in its infancy at this stage, it has the potential to bring huge benefits to the region, but not without risks largely tied to longstanding grievances over resource control, displacement, and exclusion from the benefits of oil and gas projects over many years. Community collaboration and outreach will be crucial to minimise these issues and prevent protest, sabotage or targeted attacks.

Elevated Threat of Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria

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On Wednesday, 10 July 2024, a Nigerian media source reported that Nigerian security forces had recently been placed on an elevated alert level following  receipt of intelligence concerning planned suicide bomb attacks by Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP).  These plans included attacks by the terrorists against prison and oil and gas facilities in Nigeria.  The following day, the Nigerian Defence Headquarters (DHQ) confirmed the report.

While the threat is considered to be credible, there have been a number of similar threat reports in recent years that have either failed to materialise or been quickly and quietly defeated by Nigerian security forces.

Neither the media report nor the DHQ statement contained details of the exact targets, or the specific type of attack that was being planned, however the current trend in the northeast is for the use of Person Borne IEDs (PBIED), such as that witnessed at the beginning of this month which killed over 30 people.

The latest Global Terrorism Index is currently indicating that almost half of all deaths from terrorism globally originate in the Central Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa, with Nigeria being one of only 3 countries to have not dropped out of the top 10 most impacted countries on this list since 2011.  Of note, Nigeria recorded its first increase in terrorism in three years in 2023, with total deaths rising by 34% to 524,  marking Nigeria’s highest death toll from terrorism since 2020.

Clients are advised to monitor local news and intelligence channels for latest developments and to reach out to our Team here – info@arete-group.com, for any specific advice, monitoring or reporting requirements you may have.

Read more here.

 

Russian/Chinese Expansion in Africa

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Making inroads in Africa

With last week’s state visit to Beijing by Equatorial Guinea’s President, which follows a separate visit by President Embalo (Guinea-Bissau) to Russia earlier in May (purportedly to prepare for an update to their 2018 military agreement), we analyse how international ‘powers’ are continuing to enhance their presence in the Gulf of Guinea.

Over the last 5 years, Russia and China have made significant strides in asserting their power in the region with China seeking to leverage its enhanced military reach to control strategic choke points crucial to global trade, and Russia attempting to restore its superpower status and influence Eastern and Central Europe.

Both nations clearly recognise the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea, which is not only rich in minerals and natural resources, but who’s coastline has over 20 major ports crucial for accessing new markets, however any action on their respective parts could well pose potential threats to regional peace and stability.

In the past 3 years, Russian and Chinese interests in Africa have grown significantly. China’s commercial activities have expanded quietly, highlighted by a newly commissioned pipeline transporting oil from southern Niger through Benin. Although the pipeline was briefly closed by the Porto Novo government (in response to accusations by the Nigerien government that Benin was allowing the presence of terrorist training camps on its side of the border), Chinese intervention resolved the issue, ensuring oil continued to flow through the port at Seme.

Both nations are keen to establish a naval presence to protect their strategic interests, following the historical precedent set by colonial powers. In April 2024, Russia signed a military accord with São Tomé and Príncipe for military training, logistical support and ‘possible collaborations’ raising concerns from Portugal amongst others about increased Russian influence.

As global powers vie for Africa’s vast resources, securing regional sea lanes is crucial. Tomorrow, we will analyse what has happened so far and what may be next for China and Russia in this strategic competition.In October 2021 the Russian Navy deployed a maritime task group to the Gulf of Guinea for counter-piracy operations, signalling its growing interest in the region. By July 2023, Equato-Guinean delegates at the Russo-Africa Summit in St Petersburg engaged with Russian oil, gas, and mining companies, aiming to enhance trade and economic ties. Following the summit, Russia announced it would reopen its embassy in Bioko.

In November 2023, President Putin met Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo in Moscow. Putin stated their discussions focused on security and regional relations, with plans for further collaboration. President Obiang highlighted the significant international security challenges and affirmed Russia as a traditional strategic partner of Equatorial Guinea and Africa.

Continuous Expansion

It is clear from this activity that Russia is intent on expanding its ties with Malabo, seeking a foothold for power projection into strategic regional waters. Whilst Russia’s navy continues to suffer losses in the Black Sea from Ukraine, Russia’s intent may well be to expand its footprint in the Gulf of Guinea to potentially interdict Western trade alongside securing its own interests in Africa.

President Obiang enjoys a close relationship with China, however Beijing has been far more measured in its ambitions than Russia, investing heavily in the port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea, ensuring its 550m piers are capable of accommodating the newest Chinese aircraft carriers (noting a recent Pentagon report in 2023 highlighted Equatorial Guinea as the potential site for a new Chinese naval base).

Notably, China has built a strong presence in the country for over 5 decades, with their activity being supported by a large embassy and robust security ties through bilateral engagements. Indeed, in a statement released during the recent state visit of President Obiang to Beijing, the 2 countries were said to have “elevated their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation”.

Since 2014, China has increased activities throughout the Gulf of Guinea, conducting port calls and anti-piracy drills with local navies (between 2014 and 2019 China participated in 39 military exchanges with regional partners). Again notably Angola and Nigeria are among China’s top oil suppliers and Lekki deep sea port was also built by a Chinese company. This growing engagement reflects Beijing’s strategic interest in the region, and their pursuit of a program of rapid naval expansion, both in terms of numbers and also capabilities.

In conclusion both Russia and China clearly see the Gulf of Guinea as vital ground with China particularly regarding the region as a link in its so-called “String of Pearls” – a strategic plan for a chain of naval bases around the world. These ambitions, if achieved by one or both countries, represent a significant challenge to western naval dominance of the eastern Atlantic and the entire West African coastline. While NATO is fixated on Ukraine, the Levant and Taiwan, both Moscow and Beijing are clearly keen on pushing forward with their strategies for Africa and wider global economic hegemony.

A tale of two coups?

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A tale of two coups?

Equatorial Guinea

On Friday, 17 May 2024, rumours emerged suggesting a state of emergency or an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea’s capital, Malabo. Unverified reports claimed a state of emergency had been declared the previous day and mainland borders had been closed.

However, our investigation and local intelligence found no credible evidence to support these claims, and all flights operating as scheduled during this time.
Equatorial Guinea’s leadership is particularly wary of potential coups due to the country’s history of such attempts. President Teodoro Obiang, serving the world’s longest uninterrupted presidency, has been in power since 1979. In October 2003, security services arrested a French journalist amid coup rumours. Obiang also faced a significant coup attempt in 2004 when South African mercenaries, planning to replace him with a more business-friendly figure, were arrested in Zimbabwe en route to Equatorial Guinea. This event, known as the “Wonga Coup,” failed before it could begin.

More recently, in December 2018, a coup attempt involved 40 armed mercenaries from Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, allegedly connected to radical opposition elements within the country. Whether President Obiang’s prolonged tenure is due to exceptional security measures or sheer luck remains unclear. Nonetheless, the nation’s security net remains highly vigilant, and the recent rumours may simply reflect a heightened sense of paranoia stemming from past experiences.

Democratic Republic of Congo

Two days after rumours of a potential coup in Equatorial Guinea, an actual coup attempt unfolded in the DRC capital, Kinshasa. Many details remain unclear, but here’s what is known:
– A firefight erupted outside the Gombe residence of Vital Kamerhe, sole candidate for the post of Speaker of the National Assembly.
– A second group seized the nearby Palais de la Nation, raising the flag of former Zaire.
– The attempted coup was led by 41-year-old Christian Malanga, a naturalised American citizen, who live-streamed the attack on Facebook. Malanga was killed, along with two Congolese security officials, while his son, also involved, was captured alive.
– Gunfire from the capital hit Brazzaville in the neighbouring Republic of the Congo, injuring several people.

Malanga, a wealthy businessman, politician and former Congolese army captain, lived in the US where his family had secured political asylum when he was a child. He had a criminal record for firearms and domestic violence offences in the US. Known for his grandiose aspirations, Malanga stood for election as a member of the opposition in the 2011 DRC legislative elections but was arrested for being openly anti-Kabila prior to polling day. Upon release, he returned to the US, founded the opposition United Congolese Party (UCP), and declared himself President of the “New Zaire” government in exile. He published a manifesto detailing plans to create business opportunities and reform Congo’s security services, campaigned for religious freedom in Africa, and led anti-corruption training for young Africans in Europe.

In addition to three US citizens, a naturalised British subject and the President’s former Security Advisor, Francois Beya, were also arrested. In all, 50 people have been arrested in the security sweeps that followed the events. The African Union condemned the coup and praised the military’s response. We will continue to monitor developments in both territories and provide updates.

More chapters to follow?

Since August 2020, a wave of coups and attempted coups has swept through several African countries, including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Gabon. The most recent coups in Niger (July 2023) and Gabon (August 2023) have left military leaders still acting as Heads of State.

While ‘Coup Fever’ appears to be contagious in West Africa and the Sahel, it seems last week’s rumours in Equatorial Guinea were unrelated to internal events. Given the rumours surfaced within 48 hours of the Kinshasa coup attempt, it is plausible that news of the impending/planned events in DRC reached Malabo, sparking speculation about a coup or similar actions unfolding closer to home. Unlike the coups in Francophone West Africa and the Sahel, which may have been influenced at least in part by anti-Western sentiment, increasing Russian presence, and the withdrawal of U.N. troops, the DRC incident appears to be a power grab by an individual driven by personal economic and political ambitions. There is no evidence to suggest foreign interference in the DRC event; it seems more a case of an opportunist expecting support from local elements, who ultimately abandoned him.

Regardless, the weekend’s events highlight that coups and attempted overthrows of power remain a persistent threat across the continent, driven by many factors including economic hardship, instability, poor internal security, inadequate education, and perceived weak democracies. With upcoming elections in Chad, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali, further instability is a real possibility.

For those with interests in West Africa and beyond, we offer comprehensive assistance to navigate these challenging environments. With our extensive experience advising clients on their business operations in high-risk areas, Arete are equipped to provide expert guidance and strategic planning to ensure your success and safety. Our services include:

• Planning for Operating in High-Risk Environments: From inception to completion, we provide tailored strategies to ensure your operations run smoothly.
• Risk Assessments and Threat Analysis: We deliver in-depth assessments and analyses to identify and mitigate potential threats.
• Journey Management Services: We ensure safe and efficient travel for your teams, minimizing risks along the way.

Protect your investments and ensure the safety of your personnel with our expert guidance. Contact info@arete-group.com for more information on how we can help you navigate these complex and volatile landscapes.

School Kidnapping in Nigeria – An Analysis

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School Kidnapping in Nigeria

Following the recent 10 year anniversary of the April 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from a secondary school in Chibok in Nigeria’s northeastern state of Borno, we look into what has continued to be an ever present threat in certain parts of the country. As at 14/15th April 2024, 10 years since the abduction took place, it is believed 91 of the girls are still missing.  

70 further attacks have targeted schools in the country since that day, primarily in the north of the country.  

Of these attacks: 

  • 49 have occurred in the North-Western and 11 in the north-Central geopolitical zones. 
  • More than 1,680 children have been abducted from schools.
  • According to Amnesty International, 780 children were abducted in 2021.  Bring Back Our Girls puts the numbers even higher (see the image of their poster below).
  • Additionally,180 pupils have been killed and 90 injured.  
  • 60 school staff were also kidnapped and 14 killed.  
  • 25 school building were also destroyed in these attacks.

In the first 3 months of 2024, 309 students have been abducted:

  • 29 January 2024, 5 students 3 teachers and a driver abducted, Emure, Ekiti State
  • 07 March 2024, 100 primary school pupils and 187 secondary school pupils abducted, Chiruga Community, Chikun LGA, Kaduna State.
  • 09 March 2024, 17 students abducted, Gada, Sokoto State

At the time of writing, it is believed most of these 309 have been released or rescued however the ongoing threat and fear of these incidents has a huge ongoing impact:

  • Hundreds of schools remain closed.  
  • Pupil numbers are falling as parents lose faith in state and federal security forces. 
  • School dropout rates are increasing in a country where millions already do not attend school.  
  • UNICEF says 10.5 million Nigerian children never attend school – 20% of the global total for children who never receive an education.
  • Traumatisation of pupils that survive attacks / captivity is profound.    

Girls are most at risk of dropping out of school.  They are frequently targeted by groups seeking young women as brides.  According to Girls Not Brides, an organisation working to end child marriage, the problem is most common in Nigeria’s northwestern and northeastern areas, where just over half of women aged 20-24 marry before their adulthood.

What Drives Mass Abduction of School Children?

Nigeria’s security landscape presents significant challenges, particularly in the North-West region where armed groups, often referred to as ‘bandits’, operate with impunity. These groups, backed by influential individuals seeking a share of their profits, pose a formidable threat to stability.

Mass abductions, especially in northern Nigeria, highlight the poor security measures in schools. Despite international outcry following incidents like the Chibok kidnapping, little progress has been made in enhancing school security. While the Federal Government ratified the Safe Schools Declaration in 2015 and allocated $14 million for projects in the North-East, implementation remains limited at the state and local government levels.

Bandits’ mobility and rapid manoeuvres make them elusive targets for security forces, whose centralized command structures hinder swift and effective responses to security crises. In the North-East, Islamist terrorists have targeted schools, opposing Western-style education and the education of women.

In the North-West, mass abductions have become lucrative ventures, with reported ransom demands reaching exorbitant amounts. Despite ransom payments being a federal crime, suspicions arise regarding their payment, as seen in the Kuriga abduction case, where security forces intervened just before the ransom deadline.

Mass kidnap for ransom finances other activities – frequently terrorism or political activity.  It is also driven by greed or financial hardship.  In November 2022, according to Federal Government statistics, an estimated 63% of the population was caught in multidimensional poverty, and 72% in rural areas and with the current economic climate, this is only worsening.  

Will Anything Change?

There are several factors impacting the ability, or desire, to fully focus on this issue: 

  • Nigerian Security forces are overstretched and suffer crippling organisational weaknesses that prevent them from pre-empting attacks.  
  • Terrorists and criminals retain the initiative and consistently elude security forces.  

Failure to effectively implement the Safe Schools Declaration does not bode well.  However, ultimately the solution must be political rather than a military one.  

Only the emergence of a prosperous society with good employment opportunities will improve what is currently a very permissive environment for the criminals.  The educational deficit, exacerbated by the effects of mass school abductions, act as a brake on that progress.  Even with a fully educated youth, the emergence of a stable and prosperous society is likely to take years to achieve. With Nigeria’s population expected to exceed 260million in the next 5 years, and with half of the current population being under 19 years old, education and prospects for this generation will have a huge impact on not only the country’s future, but possibly more far-reaching. We will continue to monitor and provide commentary and analysis on this continuing situation.

Red Sea Crisis and Impact on Shipping

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Red Sea Crisis

Background

During the night of 22-23 January, 2024, the UK and US launched another round of air strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen.  Eight positions were struck in this series of strikes in a campaign of targeted attacks on Houthi positions identified as being linked to attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  The action is the latest move in the international geopolitical chess match that threatens to escalate the conflict locally and potentially expand it regionally.

The impact on shipping in the region and the knock-on effects on the global economy are significant.  This analysis will examine the drivers behind the current crisis, the physical and commercial impact on shipping, the displacement of risk faced by vessels and mariners forced to use other routes to global markets and will offer a view on which countries are the winners and losers as a result of the Houthi campaign.

An armed Yemeni supporter of the Houthi movement sits on the back of an armored vehicle during an anti-Israel and anti-US rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa on January 22, 2024. (MOHAMMED HUWAIS / AFP)

For several months, shipping has been attacked by Houthi Rebels in the seas off the coast of Yemen.  Houthi rebel forces in Yemen began their campaign against shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden allegedly in response to the massive Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) response to the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 07 October 2023.  Their operational footprint encompasses one of the most important strategic choke points for international shipping and global trade, the Bab al Mandab Straits, which connects Asia to European markets.  

This ‘accident of geography’ gives the Houthis a strategic advantage and elevates the impact they can inflict on global economic stability by an order of magnitude that, arguably, is disproportionate to their actual numbers and capabilities.  Setting geography aside, like Hamas in Gaza, they also enjoy the patronage of Iran and benefit both logistically and in terms of training and financial support from their strong ties to Tehran and, in particular, the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC).  Among other weaponry and equipment, the missiles and drones – and the necessary training – used by them to attack shipping are supplied by Tehran.  

The waters of the region are a target rich environment for the Houthis, with as many as 400 ships in the area at any one time and a total of approximately 19,000 vessels transiting the Suez Canal every year.  This number is now significantly diminished as shipping companies take the decision to sail the much longer and more costly route round the southern tip of Africa as they transit in both directions between the South Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean.   

The Houthis claim their campaign is aimed at bringing an end to the IDF campaign in Gaza.  To that end, they claim their attacks have singled out vessels that have links to Israel, Israeli businesses or which are transiting to/from Israeli ports.  As the attacks continue, this claim has been demonstrably weak, or even completely false, as Houthi attacks have struck vessels that do not fit these criteria.  

Furthermore, Houthi rebels have been targeting shipping in the region since October 2015.  By August 2019, a total of 40 attacks against shipping were attributed exclusively to Houthi rebels. These early attacks began with relatively unsophisticated attacks using hand-held weapons such as RPGs (rocket propelled grenades).  This extremely common weapon system is not capable of sinking a vessel through breaching a hull, but if it were to strike a critical component of a vessel carrying a volatile cargo, such as an LNG carrier, the results could be severe.  The attacks soon escalated, and by 2019, 22 incidents saw the use of the Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles (or its Iranian built clone, the Noor missile).  In 9 instances, remote-controlled boats were utilized.  The first of these attacks in January 2017, saw a drone boat attack on a Saudi warship off Hodeidah, resulting in the deaths of two Saudi sailors.  These attacks were primarily against vessels involved in supporting the coalition that was attacking Houthi rebels in Yemen.  

A US Navy ship launches missiles in the Red Sea, Feb. 3, 2024

The attacks since October 2023 took on a different characteristic.  Following their threat against all shipping associated with Israel, and the firing of more than 100 missiles and drones in at least a dozen attacks in the weeks up to 21 December 2023, the 21 November 2023 heliborne assault and hijack of an Israeli-linked vessel, the MV Galaxy Leader, demonstrated to the world that the Houthis had evolved – or that they had direct support from the IRGC.

Following several warnings issued by the US through media statements, diplomatic channels and through international organisations, US patience finally ran out after a 03 January “Final Warning” was ignored and both the UK naval vessel HMS Diamond and several US Navy vessels were targeted on 09 January.  The response was quick and substantial.

On 12 January, in the opening round of the operation (named Operation Prosperity Guardian), US and UK military forces attacked more than 60 targets in 28 locations in Yemen that had been identified as linked to the Houthi attacks on shipping off the coast of Yemen.  6 further strike packages were launched in the following 10 days, culminating in the 22-23 January strikes. The most recent strikes took place on 03 February and further strikes are expected, until such time as the Houthi missile and drone strikes against shipping cease.

The Houthis denied that the strikes had impacted their ability to launch attacks on shipping off the Yemen coast and stated that all US and UK vessels were now also targets.  In an apparent demonstration of capability and intent, on 15 January, the US owned dry bulk cargo ship MV Gibraltar Eagle suffered a direct hit from a ballistic missile.

On 17 January, Houthis attacked the Marshall Islands-flagged, US owned and operated bulker MV Genco Picardy successfully hitting the superstructure of the vessel with a drone.  No casualties were reported, but the attack was a clear demonstration that the Houthis were not intimidated by the air and cruise missile strikes of previous days.

The 22 January strikes were carried out primarily by UK and US assets, which launched weapons from aerial and both surface and submarine naval platforms.  Additionally, Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands contributed to the mission, supplying intelligence and surveillance in support of the targeting.  Targets struck on this occasion included an underground storage site and other locations associated with missile and air surveillance capabilities.  These strikes follow a series of 7 attacks which have involved a total of 10 countries.  However, only the US and UK have been directly involved in launching weapons against targets on the ground.  

Two ships with ties to the UK and US were also targeted in early February.  MV Morning Tide, a UK-managed and owned vessel transited the Suez Canal on 02 February 2024, and was attacked approximately 57 miles west of Hodeidah, Yemen.  Houthis fired three ballistic missiles at the vessel, all of them narrowly missing their target. 

The second vessel targeted by the Houthis was the Greek-owned, Marshall Islands flagged bulk cargo carrier, MV Star Nasia. The ship is managed by a US-listed company called Star Bulk Carriers. The vessel also transited the Suez Canal at the end of January.  The vessel reported an explosion approximately 50 metres from the ship soon after it had transited the Bab el-Mandeb straits.  US Central Command (CENTCOM), stated that the vessel was attacked by three Houthi ballistic missiles over a period of 12 hours. The first missile reportedly missed the ship, although the ship was still caught in the blast radius and suffered minor damage. The second missile had no effect, and the third missile was shot down by the destroyer USS Laboon.

Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Saree, in a statement issued on 06 February claimed the attacks on the two vessels and stated strikes will continue to target all “Hostile American and British targets” along with Israeli shipping until the war in the Gaza Strip stops”.

Impact on Shipping

In November 2023, Houthis hijacked the car carrier MV Galaxy Leader.  They brazenly released a video of the incident to the world exposing that they had been trained to a very high level – presumably by their Iranian patrons.  Multiple attacks have seen the use of explosive weapons delivered either via missiles or drones.  Their targets are diverse, including container ships, bulk carriers and, interestingly, a Russian oil tanker that was narrowly missed.  A Houthi statement said the latter was targeted, allegedly, by mistake.  This statement is possibly very significant, and we will revisit that later in the analysis.

On 16 January, Bloomberg reported that 114 vessels had passed through Bab el-Mandeb strait in the days immediately after the 12 January strikes. This was 17 transits fewer than in the previous week and a dramatic reduction on the 272 transits a month earlier.

By 22 January, a total of more than 30 attacks on shipping had been launched by Houthis according to a UK MOD statement.  Other sources gave the number as 34 attacks.  These attacks have impacted directly on a total of 55 countries according to flag state, ownership, cargo destination or crewing.  

The diversion via the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 6,000 miles to a journey from Asia to Europe.  The effect of this is to push up prices in the markets as a result of increased fuel costs (Approximately $1 million) and operating costs (which include crewing costs, insurance costs, demurrage and more) and also to delay the arrival of goods to market by an average of 10 days in each direction.  There is also a knock-on effect on port operations that also add costs to goods in the end markets.

By 20 December, a total of 1.3 million 20-foot-long shipping containers had been diverted.  Global oil benchmark prices rose by 1.2% in the same period.  A further impact is the demand for shipping capacity is rising, driven by the increased duration of transits effectively ‘removing’ capacity from the shipping market.  In turn, this pushes up chartering costs even further and the price consumers pay for goods at the final destination.

The model is not new.  Shipping operators used this diversion route in March 2021 when the Suez Canal was blocked for six days when the container ship MV Ever Given ran aground, blocking the canal in both directions.  Hundreds of ships were trapped in a holding pattern in the Red Sea for weeks, and the cost of shipping a container rose from $2,000 (€1,828) to $14,000. The Ever Given crisis added months of delays to goods imported from Asia.  That crisis lasted for a week and the costs were profound.  The current crisis has run for more than 3 months already and threatens to continue for an unknown duration.  Car manufacturers in Europe have been forced to interrupt operations due to the delayed arrival of parts from Asia.  The cost of shipping a container has tripled thus far and will likely increase further.  

The impact of uncertainty on this scale will impact global markets, oil and gas spot prices, insurance premiums and drive inflation up, slowing economic recovery in countries in Europe. In mid-January, JPMorgan Chase estimated that worldwide consumer prices for goods would increase by an additional 0.7% in the first 6 months of 2024 unless the disruption to shipping ends.  The name of the US operation – Prosperity Guardian – reflects the global strategic importance of the economics of this conflict.  It is this economic impact that drove the European Union to finally agree to deploy military forces in support of the US/UK coalition operations in the region.  Germany is deploying the Sachsen Class anti-aircraft frigate Hessen to the region.  However, this vessel and any other EU assets will not be in position to operate until an unstated date in February.

New Risks?

With so many vessels diverting round the Cape of Good Hope, it is worth examining whether that diversion exposes shipping to other risks along that route.

Historically, piracy has been a serious problem in the waters off Somalia and as far south as the Mozambique channel.  However, in 2022, according to International Maritime Bureau data, no acts of piracy were reported on the east coast of the continent.  2023 saw the return of piracy when a bulk carrier was hijacked off the coast of Oman and sailed towards Somalia.  To date, 2024 has seen a single incident on 04 January when the 7 occupants of a skiff launched from a mother vessel, opened fire on a bulk carrier approximately 455nm SE of Eyl, Somalia.  Although there has been a very small number of incidents in recent times, the return of deepwater attacks off the Horn of Africa indicate that a potential return of Somali based piracy is a real threat – although still a very limited one.  Nevertheless, opportunistic criminal cartels might seek to take advantage of the increase in vessel transits in the region and could lead to a spike in piracy in coming weeks.  

On the other side of the continent, the Gulf of Guinea became the world’s most active piracy hotspot in the years up to December 2021.  However, since then, activity levels have been limited and certainly nothing like the levels seen in the years 2016-2021.  Diverted vessels are unlikely to sail through the Gulf of Guinea directly, opting to take the shortest and fastest route between the Cape of Good Hope and the coast of Sierra Leone and Guinea.  However, the last 2 years have each seen a vessel boarded and hijacked off Sierra Leone and a similar rate of activity off Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire.  To date, 2024 has seen just one piracy incident in West African waters when, on 01 January 2024, the Tuvalu flagged product tanker MT Hanna I was boarded 45 nautical miles south of Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea and nine crewmen abducted.  As with Somali groups, we have witnessed Nigerian based crime cartels operating in deep waters far from home so attacks can never be ruled out  Historically, they have operated as far south as Angolan waters and as far west as Ivorian waters.  Whilst the current threat is low, shipping companies should not ignore the latent threat posed by opportunistic criminals.  

The above all being said, is assessed that the diversion of shipping round the southern cape will not substantially increase the risk to shipping posed by latent piracy groups either on the eastern coast or in the Gulf of Guinea given the current level of threat.

Who Benefits

A US Navy ship in the Red Sea [Aaron Lau/AFP]

Almost nobody is benefitting from the crisis in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.  Interestingly and as mentioned above, the Houthis appear to have a benign attitude towards Russia and Russian linked shipping.  This reflects the supportive stance that Russia has taken in denouncing the western naval presence in the region and the recent wave of US-led air strikes.  The Houthis also have an unknown number of Soviet era legacy weapons that are now generally considered obsolete.  It is not known if these are even still operational.  Currently, Russia is not a direct supplier of weapons to the Houthis (and probably has none to spare given the intensity of the war it is prosecuting in Ukraine).  The connection is probably somewhat more subtle and potentially even strategic.

Noting the Houthis are essentially an Iranian proxy force in the region (they are supplied and trained by Iran), it is also strongly suspected that Quds Force personnel are actually active in Yemen.  Of course, Iran is a known ally of Russia and Putin, and it has been postulated by some analysts that the Hamas onslaught on 07 October 2023 against Israel, and the subsequent escalation of attacks on shipping in the Red Sea / Gulf of Aden, were both launched at the behest of the Iranian leadership in response to a Request from Moscow.  

Ultimately Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine is not going according to plan so there is perhaps some credence to this theory noting that the actions of Hamas and the Houthis have drawn the attention of the US away from the conflict in Ukraine and focussed it on supporting its principal ally in the Levant.  With a US presidential election in 9 months, Russia will be content to slowly erode US support for Ukraine in the hope that a Trump win will allow Russia to steamroller the dwindling Ukrainian forces in 2025 in the face of collapsing western support.

The above analysis is speculative, but it is credible, and the next 12 months will likely shape the future of Europe.  The game and the stakes are enormous, and, unlike the US and its European allies, Russia is content to play a long game.  In fact, Russia would prefer a protracted war in which it believes its vast resources will eventually ensure victory.  So, a rapid suppression of the Houthis and the destruction of their ability to threaten shipping in the region is essential for a number of globally strategic reasons.  Whether this can be achieved using only long-range attacks is a known-unknown.  

The west is rightly nervous about any commitment of ground forces into the region as this would almost certainly result in a direct clash with Iranian forces, and that would escalate, expand and extend the conflict, none of which is desirable, particularly in a year when both the US and the UK have major elections.

Arete will continue to monitor and critically deconstruct events in the Middle East and shipping lanes around continental Africa.

Four Nigerian Troops Killed by Suspected Pirates

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On Saturday, November 12, authorities confirmed that four Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCD) troops were killed by suspected armed pirates in Rivers State. Ahmed Audi, the NSCDC Commandant General, confirmed that the deaths occurred in Alakiri in Degema Local Government Area and promised thorough investigations into the killings.

He said: “The Minister of Interior, Dr Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo has assured that the blood of the gallant men will not be a waste. I’ll not reveal to the public our operational strategies to bring the perpetrators to book, but we are in collaboration with sister security agencies to ensure that justice is served.”

Pirates continue to operate in Nigeria’s waters despite efforts by the country’s security agencies to maintain security. Historically, attacks have mainly occurred offshore, often targeting international vessels where in recent years the aim has been to kidnap crew for ransom over product theft.

Read more about it here.