President Trump 2.0| Ukraine and wider European Security
On 20 January, 2025, Donald Trump will return to the White House as the second President to do so after a hiatus in the role. The four years that Trump spent out of power witnessed huge geopolitical developments that must be addressed by the incoming US administration. The most obvious challenges for Trump’s Foreign Policy is the Russian invasion of and continuing war in Ukraine, and the crisis in the Middle East, which just this week has taken on a new complexity given the collapse of the Assad regime in Damascus and the sudden departure of Russian and Iranian surrogate forces from Syria. This report will focus on the Ukraine invasion and wider European security issues.
The Politics of European Security
During his first presidency, Trump revealed an isolationist instinct that put ‘America First’. This posture included statements that were unsettling, but perhaps justifiable, in his stance towards the NATO alliance. He made it clear that all member nations of the Alliance should meet their treaty obligation to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence. During his election campaign in 2024, he reiterated this position and escalated the rhetoric when he said that the US would not honour its Article 5 obligations to come to the defence of any nation that failed to meet the 2% of GDP threshold.
In parallel with this strategy of deliberate uncertainty, Trump stalled any package of military support for Ukraine for 8 months after the Russians invaded. This is largely believed to be a legacy position after his warm meeting with Putin in 2018 and the resultant détente between the two leaders. However, despite lifting the blockade on military aid, Trump’s support was never clear, and uncertainty was the characterising feature of the relationship with Kyiv.
So what of European security as a whole? The recent enlargement of NATO upon accession by Finland and Sweden means that NATO’s European nations can field armies that would significantly outnumber Russia’s conventional forces, in addition to them having a vastly superior military industrial base. Experience of combat operations in Ukraine indicate that in a purely conventional conflict, Europe and NATO could more than hold its own against Russia, without the US’s assistance. This is concept, however, is inherently dangerous, as in the event of a US withdrawal from NATO, there would be no strategic counter to Russia’s immense arsenal of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. With regards to Russia, Moscow perceives European defence as being fragmented and atrophying, and moreover Putin’s imperial ambitions are unlikely to be constrained or even ended by any deal that Trump might impose upon him – especially while Trump threatens the cohesion of NATO.
So What Will Trump Do About Ukraine?
As we enter Trump 2.0, the President Elect’s position on a resolution of the war in Ukraine remains ambivalent. The influential Heritage Foundation published a paper titled Project 2025, in which it suggested that Europe should shoulder the responsibility for containing Russia while the US focusses on constraining China. This means support for Kyiv will likely be limited to military aid, but not to an extent that it becomes economically punitive for the US; in February 2024, Trump said that support to Ukraine should be viewed as loans and all aid should be repaid eventually.
Trump has repeatedly stated that he will very quickly end the war in Ukraine. This, in the context of his perceived leanings towards the Kremlin, is interpreted by most as meaning that he will exert pressure on Kyiv to adopt terms with Russia that will be brokered by Washington. However, both Putin and Zelensky have issued red-line statements that suggest neither will be receptive to terms proffered by Washington.
It is likely that Trump will accept Russian demands to hold on to Crimea and all territories gained since its invasion in 2022. He is also likely to block Ukraine’s future attempts to join NATO. He could also threaten to withdraw the US from NATO if Europe resists this strategy. Zelensky is unlikely to accept a peace deal without an open door to future NATO membership, especially in light of his recent interview where he stated that the hot phase of the war could be stopped if Ukrainian territory he controls could be taken “under the NATO umbrella” – allowing him to negotiate the return of the rest later “in a diplomatic way”
Conversely, in order to put pressure on Putin to accept the deal, Trump could remove all remaining constraints on the use of western weapons by the Ukrainian armed forces. This will not ensure a Ukrainian victory, but it will ensure that Russia cannot win.
In this scenario, an essentially frozen conflict will likely become increasingly frustrating for Washington, potentially leading to a complete cessation of military aid to Ukraine. The resultant boost to Russian confidence will likely generate increased aggression in Ukraine as well as along other borders with NATO countries. This will place a huge burden on Europe as its nations struggle to fund rearmament and expansion of its armed forces.
However, a recent meeting brokered by President Macron of France saw Trump and Zelensky meet in Paris during the ceremonial reopening of the rebuilt Notre Dame cathedral. Zelensky described the meeting as “productive”. If Trump were to feel the necessity to put pressure on Putin and were to open the floodgates of support, and deliver everything Ukraine has asked for without restraint, a Ukrainian victory might just be possible – especially given the increasingly unstable Russian economy and growing dissent against the war among its population.
Meanwhile, Europe should expect an escalation of Russia’s campaign of sabotage, cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns across the continent, including electoral influence operations as seen most recently in Romania. Europe is now facing a greater threat than at any time since 1945; Trump could make or break that situation.
