Gunmen attack ship in Gabon

At approximately 0005 hrs local time on Sunday, 05 September 2021, St Kitts and Nevis flagged offshore supply vessel MV Tampen, IMO number 9276896, was boarded by four men armed with AK-47 assault rifles close to the Owendo Anchorage in Gabon.  The vessel had sought refuge in the anchorage when it suffered a severe technical problem in its propulsion system.  The fault emerged almost as soon as the vessel sailed from Limbe in Cameroon on 26 August.  By 28 August, the Master and company decided the vessel should sail to a nearby anchorage to facilitate repairs to the system.  The vessel arrived at Owendo on 31 August having made just 4 knots during its transit which was intended to end in Dubai.

At the time of the attack, the vessel was anchored in approximate position 0°18’12″N, 009°24’9″E, at the edge of the anchorage. The vessel has 17 Crew members, all Indian.

The attackers were able to board the vessel undetected from a small boat using an aluminium ladder.  The ladder had a crude hook tied onto it that had been fashioned from the fork in a tree branch.  The attackers immediately seized a seaman and demanded to know the location of the Duty Officer.  The seaman managed to mislead them, but they found the crew accommodation unlocked and entered.  Three crew members, the Chief Officer, the Second Officer, and the Chief Cook were dragged to the rear deck, apparently with the intention of kidnapping them.  The Chief Officer and the Chief Cook resisted and attempted to escape.  The pirates shot them several times, wounding both.  The Second officer was reportedly thrown over the side of the vessel.   Reports variously state that he was thrown into a waiting boat or into the sea.  His whereabouts remain unknown at the time of writing.

The remaining crew, including the two with gunshot wounds, managed to secure the accommodation areas during the confusion around the rear deck and they proceeded to raise the alarm.  They also proceeded to give first aid to the injured crew members.

They first called their company office in India at 0105 hrs local time using WhatsApp.

At 0241 hrs local time, the crew was able to raise the port agent.  He confirmed that he would inform the port authority and the security forces.

At 0254 hrs local time, the port agent confirmed that the Harbour Master, Marine Merchant, and the Army had been contacted.

At 0345 hrs local time, the agent confirmed that a security boat and medical assistance had departed the port.

At 0530 hrs local time security boats and medical assistance arrived onboard.  The security operatives first searched the vessel before confirming that the pirates had escaped.  Local authorities mounted a search for the missing crew member.

The Master, Chief Engineer, and one more crew member were called by the port authority for investigation and statements.

Security guards were posted on board the vessel, however, anecdotal information from crew members indicates that they are poorly equipped, having only a knife and an “old gun”.

The injured crew members were evacuated to a hospital ashore where they underwent surgery and are now in post-operative recovery.

The company informed the next of kin of crew members but neither the company nor the family of the missing crew member has received any ransom call at the time of writing this report.

Factors affecting the vessels security:

The MV Tampen was transiting at a speed of just four knots for several days before it reached Owendo.  The fact that it was able to reach Owendo and remain there for a further five days before being attacked suggests that the attack was coordinated/facilitated by local actors in Owendo rather than a pirate action group (PAG) at sea.  However, the attack bears some characteristics of a Bayelsa-based group.  It is possible that this group was located elsewhere along the coast and did not detect the crippled vessel as she sailed to Owendo.  It is known that Nigerian pirates use contacts in the Nigeria diaspora in coastal communities along the length of the Gulf of Guinea coast.  Therefore, it is possible that the attack was a collaboration between local actors, possibly including persons who had been involved in supporting the repair work and a roving PAG that was within reach of Owendo.

It was reported that the crew did not detect the approach of the attackers’ boat.  This indicates that there was no deck watch in place and no effective radar watch.

The crew accommodation was not secured and it is likely the crew might have felt that Gabon and Owendo were safe and thus low-risk locations.  This is only the second recorded incident in Gabonese waters this year and the first kidnapping in the region for at least 3 months.  The vessel’s security posture indicates either a lack of awareness or complacency on the part of the crew.

The levels of violence escalated rapidly and dramatically when members of the crew resisted and attempted to escape the attackers.

Comment:

This is the second recorded incident in Gabonese waters this year.  The previous incident occurred on Sunday 07 February, when Gabon flagged, Chinese tuna fishing boat, FV Lian Peng Yu 809 was hijacked approximately 120nm SSE of Ana Chaves using high-speed boats off the Gabonese port of Port-Gentil and the crew – six Chinese nationals, three Indonesians, a Gabon national and four Nigerians – were kidnapped.

The boat, with the crew still on board, was later spotted some 110km (68 miles) from the Nigerian island of Bonny on 08 February where it was being used as a mother ship from which to mount attacks on commercial shipping (2 x tankers) with the kidnapped crew still on board.  The crew was released on 06 March after a ransom of $300,000 was paid according to the Nigerian Army.

Several other attacks occurred in nearby Sao Tome waters in the first two months of this year.

Recommendations:

All vessels operating in the Gulf of Guinea should adopt the appropriate security posture as laid down in International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS)Code and Best Management Practice 5 (BMP5).

All vessels entering ports in the Gulf of Guinea region should request an up-to-date port threat assessment from their Company Security Officer (CSO) before entering the port.

All crews should be trained and exercised in how to react to boarding and how to conduct themselves in captivity and subsequent release operations.

All vessels should keep crew accommodation secure at all times when in ports, with a single point of entry protected by a door watch.  All crew should be drilled in how to reach the citadel area in an emergency when at anchor, when berthed, and when sailing. Piracy drills and ship security assessments are one of the range of services our RMCs (Risk Management Consultants) carry out when onboard our clients’ vessels. You can view our range of maritime services here

All vessels operating in the region must ensure that at least one means of communication allows that the relevant CSO and other emergency contacts can be reached at ALL times.

References:

  1. Closed company sources in the shipping and insurance industry
  2. malayali-crew-kannur-ship-cargo-pirates.html
  3. Marine Traffic
  4. MV Tampen attacked by pirates
  5. https://www.newkerala.com/news